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Abstract
i
This thesis considers spatial and architectural language used in philosophical text to determine the value of a 
cross-disciplinary relationship between architecture and philosophy. It approaches architectural figure as more 
than just metaphor for philosophy, and proposes that philosophy relies on the spatial nature of architectural 
language to constitute itself. The case studies provided elucidate a realm where architecture and philosophy 
have been explored simultaneously; where architecture is used as a tool to develop philosophical propositions 
and where philosophical text generates architectural design. Ludwig Wittgenstein and Adolf Loos worked in this 
way, rethinking how architecture is done while rebuilding philosophical propositions. Wittgenstein’s work as an 
architect was not a break from philosophy but an exploration in architectural space that developed his philosophical 
perspective. The house he designed is considered here as an extension of the ‘visual room’, an aphorism about 
image forming in The Philosophical Investigations. Loos’s writing on an ethics of style is philosophy bound to a body 
of architectural work. His architecture, in particular the House for Josephine Baker, and its conflicts of modernity 
and the relationship between interior and exterior, is inextricably linked to his normative theories of how we should 
live. Maurice Merleau-Ponty defined phenomenology in spatial terms that depend heavily on the experience 
of architectural space. His description of the ‘phenomenal body’ and its ability to understand the ‘spatiality of 
a situation’ is evidence for an epistemological link between phenomenology and architecture. The architecture 
of Steven Holl is analysed for its reconstruction of Merleau-Pontian spatiality in the Residence for the Swiss 
Ambassador, a commission that offered Holl a generous affordance of space with which to explore this influence.
The main philosophical text used in the thesis is the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre due to the largely ignored 
latent spatial nature of it. It is significant that the text relies on spatial relationships to convey its meaning. Sartre’s 
concepts have been defined, developed and implemented by architecture in the resulting design, ‘A House for 
Sartre’. The design builds on Sartrean concepts of the self, other people, objects in the world and consciousness. 
It does this by rethinking and rebuilding on this philosophy, while at the same time rethinking and rebuilding 
the architecture of the house, a domestic space. The programme of a ‘house’ offers concepts of domesticity as 
context for the design project, and this adds another dimension to the philosophy. The project pushes the limits of 
Sartre’s descriptions and tests his examples in the tangible realm of architecture. Through inhabitation of such an 
architecture, one can better gain an understanding of this philosophy. As Sartre so often appeals to his readers to 
inspect the state of their own consciousness, then perhaps most significantly, the architecture provides not only a 
conscious experience of the house, but an experience where inhabitants are conscious of their own consciousness 
in ‘A House for Sartre’. 
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1The use of architectural language can be found throughout many 
philosophical texts. When writing on phenomenology, analytical 
philosophy and ethics, philosophers employ spatial language 
and concepts to explain ideas. These ideas are often considered 
entirely distinct from their architectural analogies. Aphorisms and 
propositions described in terms of spaces and spatiality could 
be considered metaphors. However, it is significant that this 
kind of language extends across a wide range of philosophical 
writing. Philosophy is actually bound to the architectural figure. 
Wigley writes that although “philosophy appeals to architecture 
to constitute itself, only to immediately subordinate architecture 
as mere material”1, architecture is not a metaphor amongst 
many in the realm of philosophy. Architecture is the foundation of 
philosophy; the framework in which philosophical problems can 
be described and solved; the method for practicing philosophy. 
Architecture provides a tangible means for an exploration of 
concepts relating to our existence in the world: philosophy. At 
the same time, philosophy describes analytical and experiential 
concepts that give meaning to architecture. The two disciplines 
do not merely borrow language from one another; their very 
experiential nature makes them epistemologically linked in 
dealing with the essence of our living in the world.
Architectural phenomenologists and philosopher-architects, such 
as Pallasmaa, Pérez-Gómez and Diller + Scofidio, attempt to 
bridge the gap between lived experience – the experience 
1  Wigley, M. (1993). The Architecture of Deconstruction: Derrida’s Haunt. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. p. 18
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2of architecture and our spatial environment – and conceptual motives for design. Pallasmaa uses the term ‘lived 
space’ to mean space that has been injected with existential meaning: “Lived space is always a combination of 
external space and inner mental space, actuality and mental projection”2. These philosopher-architects attempt 
to understand the person-environment relationship3 and the nature of existence. In architectural history we have 
seen philosopher-architects use abstract metaphysical concepts as source material for design, and conversely for 
architecture to act as a spatio-visual medium for investigations about existence, being and meaning. Metaphysical 
values are embodied by the spatial practice of architecture.
The aim of this thesis is to examine cases where philosophical text is laden with architectural meaning or 
architecture is constituted by philosophical concepts, and determine the value of this cross-disciplinary relationship. 
This is dealt with in Part 1 where case studies are provided as architectural precedents. Part 2 analyses a 
philosophical text for its dependence on the architectural figure and its possible contributions to architecture. Part 3 
describes the design component of the thesis, an architecture rooted in the philosophical concepts assessed in Part 
2. The resulting design by research aims to provide an understanding of certain philosophical concepts through the 
experience of architectural space. In other words, through inhabitation of the architecture one could gain a better 
understanding of the philosophical meaning of the text.
The case studies in this thesis show architecture as representing the nature of the world and human understanding 
of what ‘is’. The first case study is the Stonborough-Wittgenstein House in Vienna, designed by 20th Century 
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. This house is an example of the practice of architecture contributing to the 
development of philosophy. Wittgenstein’s central areas of philosophy were meaning, understanding and language. 
The house elucidates how language “operates within a fluid territory of practice with the world it represents”4. 
Thus spatial and visual constructs are inextricably linked with the concepts of philosophy of language. With a 
different approach, Adolf Loos wrote on an ethics of style in the modern world and simultaneously experimented 
with philosophical concepts in his architecture. The subject-object dichotomy in the House for Josephine Baker, 
2 Pallasmaa, J. (2000). Lived space in architecture and cinema. The architecture of image: Existential space in cinema. Helsinki, Finland, Finnish Building 
Centre. p. 3 
3  Seamon, D. (1990). Awareness and reunion: A phenomenology of the person-environment relationship as portrayed in the New York photographs of André 
Kertész. Place Images in the Media. L. Zonn. Totowa, New Jersey, Roman and Littlefield p. 87-107.
4  Last, N. (2008). Wittgenstein’s House: Language, Space, & Architecture. New York, Fordham University Press. p. 1
3a cabaret star in Paris in the 1920s, is a demonstrative example of this. The final case study examines Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, as his philosophy is often linked to the architectural phenomenologists. Rather than writing 
generally about his phenomenology, this thesis assesses a particular passage and the success of its use as a 
generator for design in the architecture of Steven Holl.
Jean-Paul Sartre, a leading 20th Century philosopher in Paris, did not write directly on architecture although he 
spent much of his life considering questions about phenomenology, which, I argue here, is spatial by nature. Unlike 
other philosophers concerned with phenomenology, his work has not been investigated in terms of architectural 
space (with the exception of an interpretation of his writing on the imagination with respect to architecture dealing 
with absence5). However, his work on the ego, transcendence and the existence of others – phenomenological 
concepts – beg spatial questions. Sartre’s interpretations of concepts are in relation to the world, to objects and 
to spaces we encounter. This thesis describes Sartre’s spatial metaphors and aphorisms pertaining to spatial 
concepts that are significant in the realm of architecture. 
The role of design in this project is to, through rigorous application of method, represent these spatio-visual 
abstractions of phenomenology in the design of ‘A House for Sartre’. The programme of a ‘house’ provides objects 
and concepts pertaining to domesticity that are useful material for design. The architecture provides a novel 
perspective of domestic architecture as the ‘house’ now appeals to our phenomenological ontology. In other words, 
an experience of the architecture would involve recognising it as a ‘house’ but submitting our notion of ‘house’ to an 
ontological inquiry of existence. 
Sartre questions the existence of concepts by appealing to the reader to use introspection to examine the state of 
their own consciousness. The architecture similarly depicts these concepts by forcing the inhabitant to inspect their 
own understanding of what ‘is’. Architecture is normally understood through experience, so it is significant that ‘A 
House for Sartre’ now appeals to its inhabitant to be conscious of their conscious experience of the house. 
5  Herrington, S. (2008). “You Are Not Here: Sartre’s Phenomenological Ontology and the Architecture of Absence.” Architecture and Phenomenology(Autumn 
2008) p. 51-64.
4Philosophy, the study of the fundamental problems of existence, 
knowledge, truth, reason, reality, meaning, mind, and value, 
has influenced architecture before. It is not the intention of this 
paper to analyze the parallel developments of philosophy and 
architecture throughout history. This paper is concerned with the 
direct influence of philosophical aphorisms in architectural spaces 
and architecture’s role in the formwork of philosophy. The spatial 
metaphors of philosophy, the physical analogies of metaphysics, 
and the experiential nature of existential philosophy have 
ramifications for architecture. Architecture is the framework of 
our being in the world, and thus articulates “the surface between 
the experiencing self and the world”6. Architecture is the physical 
construal of the essence of existential space. Although this 
chapter addresses 20th Century philosophy and its ramifications 
for the built form it is not an attempt to define architecture as 
applied philosophy; this would be a “cliched misunderstanding”7. 
Rather, architecture is shown to be a medium for the development 
of philosophy and vice versa. At the same time as architecture 
appeals to philosophical concepts, philosophy is understood and 
described by its practitioners within the realm of the architectonic.
Architectural language appears in many philosophical texts from 
Descartes to Derrida8. Employed in the form of metaphor, it is 
often too easily dismissed as just metaphor. Stephen Priest 
6  Pallasmaa, J. (2000). Lived space in architecture and cinema. The architecture of image: Existential space in cinema. Helsinki, Finland, Finnish Building  
Centre. p. 2
7  Leitner, B. (2000). The Wittgenstein House. New York, Princeton Architectural Press. p. 10
8  Wigley, M. (1993). The Architecture of Deconstruction: Derrida’s Haunt. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press.
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When Philosophy Meets Architecture
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Philosophy is Spatial: Where am ‘I ’?
5argues that transcendental philosophy in particular (the subject of Sartre’s work) is “contaminated”9 by spatial 
metaphors and images in the text. He recommends disregarding any physical construals of the spatial language in 
fully understanding the meaning of the text; that the spatial relationships between concepts should not be thought 
of as physical relations. However, Priest admits this is “psychologically difficult…perhaps because we are used to 
thinking about the external world”10.This is a significant admission as phenomenology is about the physical world 
and relationships within it. Its usefulness is located in the world, dealing with experience of the real world. Rather 
than freeing oneself from the spatial metaphor in philosophy, we can make use of it in our understanding.
Wigley goes a step further. Following Derrida’s notion that architectural metaphor is never innocent, he writes that 
“the discourse [of philosophy] is within the spatial metaphor rather than the metaphor is within the discourse… 
More than the metaphor of foundation, [architecture] is the foundational metaphor. It is therefore not simply a 
metaphor”11. Architectural figure in philosophical text cannot be removed or ignored in the way that an analogy in 
everyday speech may be replaced with another. Its role is not of an analogous discourse among many. It is bound 
to philosophy just as philosophy is bound to architectural space, “there is no philosophy without space”12.
Architectural language appears in philosophical text in the form of conspicuous architectural discourse as well as 
spatial metaphor. While Kant and Heidegger describe metaphysics in terms of a building, Nietzsche refers to “self-
experience through architecture”13. Nietzsche dismissed historical symbolism and styles and believed architecture 
should seek “to affect – and to strike ‘reflections’ from – the beholder’s psyche”14. He feels the absurdity of the 
physical world, and only finds meaning in it through focusing on the individual experience of the human being. 
Finding ourselves in architecture is an important practice in finding this meaning for Nietzsche, as he writes that 
we want to find “ourselves translated into stones and plants; we want to have ourselves to stroll in, when we take a 
9  Priest, S. (2000). The subject in question: Sartre’s critique of Husserl in The Transcendence of the Ego. London, England; New York, USA, Routledge. p. 8
10  Ibid.
11  Wigley, M. (1993). The Architecture of Deconstruction: Derrida’s Haunt. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. p. 17-19
12  Ibid. p. 22
13  Buddensieg, T. (1999). Architecture as empty form: Nietzsche and the art of building. Nietzsche and “An architecture of our minds”. A. Kostka and I. 
Wohlfarth. Los Angeles, USA, The Getty Research Institute. p. 262
14  Ibid. p. 262
6turn in these porticoes and gardens”15. He demands that new architecture must reject past ecclesiastical influence, 
which is meaningless now that we are “godless people”16, and to reflect the true image of man. 
When Nietzsche mentions architecture it is not segregated from his philosophy; it is an important part of his 
metaphysics. Buildings and places exist not in any world but in our world, granting them the highest metaphysical 
significance human beings can experience and participate in. Architecture protects man from the godless situation 
he has found himself in by embodying his modern values; it “guards the ‘I’ against the consciousness of his own 
weakness”17. 
Nietzsche influenced a variety of architects who attempted to capture the essence of his thought in their 
revolutionary designs18. His references to building and architecture perhaps allow architects to interpret his work. 
Erich Mendelsohn and Bruno Taut come to mind. However, there is no evidence in one architect’s built repertoire 
for the rigorous application of his particular philosophical thoughts; rather, vague post-justification for architecture 
that seems to speak of the same ideals. For a more entangled relationship between the aphorisms of modern 
philosophy and meaningful architecture we will now turn to philosophers of the 20th Century. 
The analytic philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein grew from existential origins also. Wittgenstein worked with logical 
propositions and language in his first work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus19 to show the limits of human knowledge. 
In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein became less abstract and spatial concepts emerged in his philosophy of 
mind in The Philosophical Investigations20. Inhabitation, boundaries and surroundings enter in his philosophy. 
Wittgenstein designed the Stonborough-Wittgenstein house in 1925, between writing these two major works. The 
house is crucial in understanding the development in his philosophy. The practice of designing appears to have 
been a process for Wittgenstein in which his philosophy developed and included spatial concepts.
15  Nietzsche, F. (1988). Die froeliche Wissenschaft. Saemtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe. G. Colli and M. Montinari. Munich, Germany, Deutscher 
Taschenbuchverlag and de Gruyter. 3. p. 264
16  Ibid. p. 524
17 Breitschmid, M. (2007). “Nietzsche’s “Architecture for the perceptive”: From sacred space towards a space for reflection.” Spaces of Utopia Spring(4) p. 86
18  Neumeyer, F. (1999). Nietzsche and modern architecture. Nietzsche and “An architecture of our minds”. A. Kostka and I. Wohlfarth. Los Angeles, USA, The 
Getty Research Institute.
19  Wittgenstein, L. (1922/2007). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. New York, Cosimo Inc.
20  Wittgenstein, L. (1953/2009). The Philosophical Investigations. West Sussex, UK, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
7Aphorisms in Wittgenstein’s Investigations include references to image forming and the hypothetical ‘visual 
room’, which explores spatial qualities involved in imagining and thinking and shows the limits of language and 
thought in terms of space. The house he designed is an important application of the concepts he describes in this 
aphorism about an image of a room. The room is a metaphor but its spatiality is explored in both his writing and his 
exploration in architecture. The built form and written philosophy inform one another. In this later philosophical work, 
Wittgenstein also began to use the word phenomenology, and his philosophy is linked with phenomenology due to 
its concern with immediate experience with the world21. The direct connection between Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
and his own work of architecture will be further explored in the first case study.
In addition to the advantage of his extremely wealthy background to provide an opportunity to freely experiment 
in architecture, Wittgenstein was living and working in one of the intellectual centres of the world at the time. 
In the first two decades of the 20th Century, it was from Vienna that many of the ideas that defined and shaped 
the century emerged22. Artists, political and social theorists, philosophers and architects provided much creative 
discourse in the city, although this discourse was admittedly dominated by the “ambitious bourgeois intelligentsia”23. 
Nevertheless new doctrines and disciplines were shaping the modern world and an important characteristic was 
the merging of art, science and culture. Wittgenstein’s attempt to reduce the complexity of the world to an abstract 
reduction in philosophy – coined “orthodox modernism”24 – was the theme in the work of many of his Viennese 
contemporaries. Klimt’s paintings, Schönberg’s twelve-tone scale, and Adolf Loos’s architecture and gift for 
journalism25, all indulge in their own subjective abstractions of the world. 
Architect Adolf Loos, author of the essays Ornament and Crime26 and Architecture27, has been described as a 
phenomenologist as he “reflects on ornament and visual patterns as they relate to explorations of character (as 
21  Hintikka, J. (1996). Ludwig Wittgenstein: Half-Truths and One-and-a Half-Truths. Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Kluwer Academic Press. p. 209
22  Springer, K. (2006). A “Romanticism of the Nerves”: The Literary Fin-de-Siècle. Vienna 1900 and the heroes of modernism. C. Brandstätter and H. Bisanz. 
London, Thames & Hudson. p. 363
23  Ibid.
24  Metzger, R. Ibid.Vienna Around 1900: The Duration of Denial. p. 26
25 Kurdiovsky, R. Ibid. Joseph Maria Olbrich. p. 293
26  Loos, A. (1908/1931). Ornament and Crime. Trotzdem, 1900-1930. Vienna, Prachner.
27  Loos, A. (1910/2006). Architecture. Architecture and Design in Europe and America, 1750-2000. A. Harrison-Moore and D. C. Rowe. Oxford, Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd.
8habit) and environment (as habitat)”28. Although he writes normative theories for architecture, he does so from 
a standpoint reflecting on the nature of reality. His theories are based on the cultural situation in Vienna in the 
early 20th Century, showing him to be highly sensitive to the circumstances surrounding him, despite sometimes-
conflicting judgements regarding how people should live. His critiques of Viennese life and architecture are ethical 
ones, spurring from an empirical approach, qualifying him as an architect-philosopher. Loos is an important figure in 
this thesis, as his architecture is ontologically linked with his philosophical style of writing.
Loos’s logic is parallel to his approach as an architect. The contrasting dichotomies of the form and content of his 
criticisms of culture are analogous to the sharp conflict between the facades and interiors of his buildings. He wrote 
scathingly about bourgeois lifestyles in his own extravagant fin-de-siècle style, while his architecture fronted with 
austere, ornament-free exteriors and indulged in theatrical spectacle inside. Explicitly concerned with the “essential 
condition of modernity”29 lying in mankind’s direct contact with the essence of the world, his buildings are an attempt 
to arouse these sentiments in people. 
While Loos’s writing is loosely connected with phenomenology, it is expressed more clearly in his architecture. The 
connection between concrete essences in one’s environment and oneself is inherent in the spatial configurations 
and relationships in his buildings. His built work is an extension of the theories he propagated, revealing in 
much more detail his claims for how one must live in one’s environment. As an architect and a philosopher, 
Loos’s phenomenology is best expressed through his buildings. The relationship between Loos’s writing and his 
architecture forms the second case study.
Neither Wittgenstein nor Loos are normally associated with phenomenology, the method of philosophy most 
popular with architectural discourse. Phenomenology is a philosophical method that aims to provide an essential 
contribution to the foundations of science30. It primarily analyses structures of consciousness and phenomena in 
relation to consciousness. It is considered an objective study, as it looks at consciousness not from the perspective 
of ‘me’, but of all consciousnesses alike. This is why Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and other phenomenologists consider 
it to be a foundation for knowledge; it is about the essence of being. Phenomenology can be described as the 
28  Zielinski, M. (2003). “A Semiotic Phenomenology of Aesthetic Systems.” The American Journal of Semiotics 19(1/4).
29 Tournikiotis, P. (1991). Adolf Loos. New York, Princeton Architectural Press. p. 30
30 Koestenbaum, P. Husserl’s Philosophical Position. The Paris Lectures. E. Husserl.
9method of inquiry concerning the nature of consciousness, the relationship between consciousness and the world, 
and the essence of being. It is the realm between one’s consciousness and the world that provides phenomenology 
a spatial grounding. If ‘being’ relates directly to its physical surroundings or if consciousness transcends the body 
are dilemmas situated in a spatial context. 
It is significant that in the aphorisms of phenomenology, spatial metaphor and imagery pervade the work. 
Metaphors situated in physical space are just metaphors, they are about phenomenological concepts such as 
mind, body, self and thought. However, these metaphors are relevant in form and content, as mind, body self 
and thought depend on the spatial relationships befitting their analogies. Phenomenology is never specifically 
about architecture, and when 20th Century phenomenologists write about buildings, room and spaces it is almost 
never an architectural critique. Nor is architecture ever the total embodiment of phenomenological thought. 
Architecture is, however, a spatial context and an entirely relevant standpoint from which to understand concepts of 
phenomenology. 
Martin Heidegger viewed philosophy as addressing the immediacies of human existence. This was significant in the 
age of industrial and technocratic revolutions. As Heidegger dealt with human experience, his philosophy includes 
ideas about living and inhabiting, which inevitably have consequences for architecture. In his essay Building 
Dwelling Thinking31 Heidegger describes building as located by human existence and built according to and shaped 
by the characteristics of the place and inhabitants. Buildings and bridges alike impact on peoples lives physically 
but also experientially. The building of a bridge “ha[s] phenomenological significance much greater than the sum of 
its technical expediencies”32. 
Like Wittgenstein, Heidegger believed that although man sees himself as a master of language, it is really language 
that reigns as the master of man33. He differentiates between mere objects and the more significant things, which 
bring humans into contact with the essence of life: a bridge or a building is not just an object, it is a built thing, a 
“part of an ongoing human experience of building and dwelling”34. Building, dwelling and thinking are not separate 
31 Heidegger, M. (1954/1975). Building, Dwelling, Thinking. Poetry, Language, Thought. New York, Harper and Row.
32  Sharr, A. (2007). Heidegger for Architects. Oxon, UK, Routledge. p. 48
33  Heidegger, M. (1954/1975). Building, Dwelling, Thinking. Poetry, Language, Thought. New York, Harper and Row.
34  Sharr, A. (2007). Heidegger for Architects. Oxon, UK, Routledge. p. 46
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concepts of architectonics and function, merely means and ends, they are essentially interrelated and a culmination 
of one another, one and the same. Heidegger calls for his readers to conjure up an image of a hypothetical bridge, 
refers to an existing well-known bridge and asks them to imagine a hypothetical farmhouse to elucidate his points 
about architecture, thinking and being.
The Phenomenology of Perception35, by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, deals explicitly with space and its relation to 
the body. Merleau-Ponty describes his “phenomenological reduction [as] that of an existential phenomenology”, 
meaning it is about existence in the world. He, like Sartre, aimed to reduce fundamental structures of 
consciousness to concrete essences. The body is recognized as “inherently expressive of existence as a whole”36 
and is the mediator of our perception of the world. Perception is not the passive reception of sense-impressions, it 
is the act of consciousness being towards-the-thing through the intermediary of the body. As the body acts towards 
things in the world, there are important spatial relationships underlying Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. The body, 
as a subject for perception, becomes the central core for the realm of space. Space is orientated to this locus, 
creating what Merleau-Ponty calls a third kind of spatiality that underlies any distinction between form and content. 
This spatiality is the result of the subject of perception arranging the world into figure-ground configurations, where 
the focus of objects makes them into objects for the bodily gaze or grip. To further illustrate the spatial nature of his 
phenomenological interrogation Merleau-Ponty uses a unique notion of depth. His phenomenology in relation to the 
architecture of Steven Holl will be dealt with in the third case study.
The existential philosophers and phenomenologists mentioned here write about the experience a person has with 
the world. This tendency for philosophers to “return… to the proto-phenomena of lived experience”37 is guided by 
the desire to find concrete essences and relationships with what ‘is’. Such relationships between the self – whether 
this is represented by the body, the ego, culture or a series of propositions – and what is outside the self, are 
essentially spatial ones. In the next chapter I will examine the three case studies where philosophy is construed 
through the built form. I have chosen these case studies to reflect not just the interpretation of phenomenologists 
35  Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945/1962). Phenomenology of Perception. Paris, Gallimard. p. 9
36 Langer, M. M. (1989). Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception: A Guide and Commentary. London, The Macmillan Press Ltd. p. xiii
37  Grier, N. F. (1981). Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: A Comparative Study of the later Wittgenstein, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. New York, 
State University of New York Press. p. 228
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that have been looked at in the past, but examples from a broader 
scope to illustrate the spatial foundations of philosophy. The 
philosophies of Wittgenstein, Loos, and Merleau-Ponty will now 
be analysed for their spatial implications and evidence they have 
been explored physically by architecture.
The completion of the Stonborough-Wittgenstein House in 
Vienna in 1929 – designed for his sister after taking the project 
over from Paul Engelmann – gave Wittgenstein the chance to 
return to working on philosophical problems. The design of the 
house was not a break from philosophy, but an opportunity for 
Wittgenstein to explore the problems of analytical philosophy 
in a physical context. Working in architectonics enabled him to 
see the concepts of philosophy in three-dimensional space, with 
spatio-visual relationships with one another. To understand this 
interrelated context in which Wittgenstein developed his later 
philosophy, it is appropriate to look at a discussion in which 
Wittgenstein mentions spatial relationships as philosophical 
metaphor: the example of the visual room. It is a discussion about 
images and image forming where the philosophical concepts 
involved are expressed visually and spatially. The discussion 
invites the reader to imagine the image of a room as an example 
to provide evidence for his point regarding private thought. 
Although the visual room is a metaphor, its spatial qualities are 
significant in supporting Wittgenstein’s claim. These spatial 
qualities, which would never have entered into a Wittgensteinian 
Chapter 2
Case Study: The Visual Room
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Figure 1 
Stonborough-Wittgenstein 
House, Vienna
discussion before the design of the house in Vienna, are the 
same qualities Wittgenstein explored in the design of the house. 
When Wittgenstein addressed the question ‘what is the mental 
image?’ he quickly dismisses it for more pressing issues like 
image forming and images and sensations38. He realized that 
images are not concrete phenomena, but psychological concepts; 
the act of conjuring up an image of something. The example he 
uses is the visual room, an object with spatial and architectonic 
qualities39. This is significant as it shows spatial concepts to be 
essential to the philosophy of the image and image forming. The 
importance of the spatial construal of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, 
with regards not only to images and image forming, but to his 
private/public issues and the inner/outer issue can be shown 
through an analysis of the Stonborough-Wittgenstein House. 
In fact, it is significant that Wittgenstein theorized about the 
image only after his experiment into architecture. After working 
in the spatial and architectonic dimensions that architecture 
is concerned with, Wittgenstein returned to philosophy with 
the empirical and spatial (as opposed to solely analytical) 
approach to philosophical problems, including image forming. 
With its foundations in visual space, the visual room concept 
is an example of Wittgenstein’s spatial approach to philosophy 
influenced by and integral to his work in architectonics and 
design. The discussion of the visual room is the “strongest 
38  Wittgenstein, L. (1967/1981). Zettel. Oxford, Blackwell Publishing. 
Paragraph 621
39  Wittgenstein, L. (1953/2009). The Philosophical Investigations. West 
Sussex, UK, Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Paragraph 398
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evidence for Wittgenstein’s association of the spatial and the linguistic”40, leading to a crossing back and forth of 
concepts between the realms of philosophy and architecture.
Wittgenstein’s aphorisms regarding the image were characteristically rooted in a concern with the use of words that 
describe the concept. He differentiated the image from sensations; auditory images and visual images are distinct 
from heard sounds and the sensation of sight41. Wittgenstein rejects that images are derived from perception and 
considers imaging as a unique phenomenon.
Rather than regarding the image as a thing, Wittgenstein suggests that image forming is temporal, occurring over 
time and is therefore an action or activity. Moreover, image forming is voluntary, unlike the observation involved 
in sense-impressions and hallucinations42. He concludes that the image cannot be a concrete thing inside our 
consciousness, because if this were the case, we would passively receive images rather than wilfully conceive 
of them. This image forming process, Wittgenstein says, should be thought of as “visual experience in terms of 
our each having access to images that no one else is privy to”43. This visual experience is unique as it transcends 
qualities that can be applied to other real-world experiences. Wittgenstein’s example to show these characteristics 
of visual experiences is the visual room. 
 “The ‘visual room’ is the one that has no owner. I can as little own it as I can walk about it, or look at it, or point to it. 
Inasmuch as it cannot be anyone else’s it is not mine either. In other words it does not belong to me because I want 
to use the same form of expression about it as about the material room in which I sit. The description of the latter 
need not mention an owner, in fact it need not have an owner. But then the visual room cannot have any owner. 
‘For’ – one might say – ‘it has no owner outside or in.’”44.
It is significant that the example Wittgenstein gives for visual impressions is a room – a three-dimensional, spatial, 
architectonic thing rather than anything else. It is the objective of this chapter to show the spatial nature of the 
image and image forming and the role of architecture in this aspect of philosophy.
40  Last, N. (2008). Wittgenstein’s House: Language, Space, & Architecture. New York, Fordham University Press. p. 185
41  Wittgenstein, L. (1967/1981). Zettel. Oxford, Blackwell Publishing. Paragraph 621
42  Kose, G. and D. Corriss (1996). Imaging: Theoretical Alternatives. Problems of Theoretical Psychology. C. Tolman. Ontario, Captus Press Inc.
43  McGinn, M. (1997). Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations. London, Routledge. p. 183
44  Wittgenstein, L. (1953/2009). The Philosophical Investigations. West Sussex, UK, Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Paragraph 398
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The visual room is the visual impression one constructs when 
trying to understand what someone means when they say they 
are sitting in a room. By saying you know what they mean, you 
are saying you know how to think of the object that they mean45. 
We are compelled to think of the visual room as a quasi-physical 
thing; as possessing physical qualities, relationships in space 
and the ability to be assigned grammatical concepts. However 
these qualities for which a real-world room may be true are 
inappropriate and nonsensical for the visual room. For example, it 
makes no sense to possess a visual impression, nor to speak of 
its outside if the impression is of the inside. One cannot enter or 
exit the visual room in the sense one can in the world.
Wittgenstein concludes that the visual room shows “a new way 
of speaking, a new comparison”46. He compares the visual 
experience of the room with a picture of it: both appear to be 
perspectival in nature. In addition to the visual impression being 
incapable of having features its real-world counterpart exerts, 
the visual impression has its own objective features that are not 
also features of the object it is an image of. The perfectly cubic 
room does not appear as a symmetrical object with edges of 
equal length, the image from inside the cubic room appears with a 
vanishing point, the image is with a one or two point perspective. 
Similarly artefacts in the room like tables act in the same way. The 
visual impression of a square table is not a square, it is seen 
45  McGinn, M. (1997). Wittgenstein and the Philosophical 
Investigations. London, Routledge.
46  Wittgenstein, L. (1953/2009). The Philosophical Investigations. West 
Sussex, UK, Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Paragraph 400
Figure 2 
A perfectly cubic room
Figure 3
... does not appear as a 
perfect square
Figure 4
... but appears with 
perspective
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in perspective. This comparison, between the visual room and a picture of it, is a comparison of two-dimensional 
representations and relies on the spatial qualities of the three dimensional objects being represented. The visual 
room shows that the problem of image forming is a spatial one.
The visual room shows that this particular philosophical problem, of image forming, is sited in space. This is 
not altogether conflicting with the notion that philosophical problems are situated within language. It is perhaps 
evidence of an inclusive realm where language and space intersect, what Nana Last calls a “shared territory 
between the spatial and the linguistic”47. The intention of the visual room is to address private mental imagery, 
the relation between inner and outer and no doubt publicly accessible language, however, language is no longer 
the “specific outward criterion”48 for Wittgenstein. Other criteria, such as space, vision and architectonics become 
frameworks for comparison. This somewhat more generous gesture of Wittgenstein’s to allow for a foundation 
for definition other than language could not have occurred in the Tractatus. In fact, the first documentation of 
Wittgenstein’s overt change in thinking and return to philosophy are dated in the months immediately following the 
house’s completion49. It is important that only after his work designing the Stonborough-Wittgenstein House did 
Wittgenstein use visual space as a foundation for the solution to a philosophical problem. After this experiment he 
had more freedom to discuss philosophical tasks in spatio-visual terms, and the spatial realm was a new framework 
in which philosophy could situate itself.
Issues involved in the visual room example have their application in the architecture of the House. The act of 
envisioning a room that is not there is the task of the architect, and Wittgenstein’s role as ‘architect’ influenced 
his use of the visual room and the topic of the image. Furthermore, the topic of the image and its example of 
the visual room is evidence for the spatial nature of these kinds of philosophical problems and the language we 
use to describe them. Rather than considering the House as a distinct entity from Wittgenstein’s philosophy, it 
is considered as an extension of the visual room. The House is an experiment with spatial limits that makes the 
boundaries of architecture, philosophy and language less distinct.
47  Last, N. (2008). Wittgenstein’s House: Language, Space, & Architecture. New York, Fordham University Press. p. 183
48  Ibid. p. 184
49  Wijdeveld, P. (1994). Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect. London, Thames and Hudson. p. 183
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When Wittgenstein says of the visual room “it has no master 
outside it, and none inside it either”50 he discloses the image’s 
absence of true spatial qualities: its lack of ownership as well 
as the non-existence of boundaries. He alludes to spatial and 
visual (as well as material and non-material) conflict. Seemingly 
the visual room can be inhabited, if the image conjured is of 
someone in a room, but it does not make sense for its boundaries 
to be crossed. This is a problem with language and exposes the 
latent spatial nature of language itself. This kind of language is 
introduced after the completion of the house and contains implicit 
spatial interpretations. In using language that refers to space, 
Wittgenstein is showing the significance of spatial relationships in 
language and hence philosophy. He writes in the Investigations 
that the relationship language has with the world is not the “formal 
unity” he had previously imagined. Rather, “we are talking about 
the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about 
some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm”51. We can infer that 
discussion of boundaries, inhabitation and accessibility need not 
be separated from their spatial connotations.
The articulation of boundaries, an issue Wittgenstein finds with 
the visual room, is also a significant aspect of the design of 
the Stonborough-Wittgenstein House. All of the interior doors 
between rooms are double-layered, like the exterior doors. 
However, unlike the exterior doors, this is not a functional 
solution. The interior doors are metal framed with either glass or 
50  Wittgenstein, L. (1953/2009). The Philosophical Investigations. West 
Sussex, UK, Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Paragraph 398
51  Ibid. Paragraph 108
Figure 5
Stonborough-Wittgenstein 
House, an extension of the 
‘visual room’
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metal infill. The glass is either transparent or opaque. This creates 
a hierarchy of thresholds throughout the House. Boundaries 
between rooms are completely opaque and solid, entirely 
transparent and fluid, or partially translucent. Moreover, due to the 
double layering the threshold is different depending on which way 
you are crossing the boundary. The doors represent a complexity 
with respect to boundaries, both physical and metaphorical. 
The physical boundaries in the house allude to the nature of the 
boundaries of language.
The materiality of the numerous double-layered doors in the 
house refers to a concept of privacy. Margarethe’s private rooms 
are separated from the salon by doors with transparent glass 
on the inside and opaque sheet metal on the outside, the most 
complex boundary for the most private section of the House. 
Protecting the personal spaces with visually and spatially 
impenetrable materials links the House to the notion of private 
mental space portrayed on the visual room example. Image 
forming is an exclusive or privileged act, shown to be performed 
in private mental space, a realm analogous to the demarcation 
of private space in the House. Again the House has lessened 
the distinction between architectonics and language by exploring 
private mental space and private personal space literally as 
space. The privacy of one’s exclusive image of the visual room is 
analogous to the privacy of the boudoir.
The floor plan of the House refers to the concepts of inhabitation 
and accessibility. To reach Margarethe’s bedroom from the hall, 
one must pass through the salon and then her private living room. 
Figure 8
Double-layered doors with 
opaque glass infill to this 
side, clear glass to far side
Figure 6
Sheet metal to this side, 
clear glass to far side
Figure 7
clear glass to both sides
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Figure 9
Plan of the ground floor,
Stonborough-Wittgenstein House
Figure 10
Diagram of materiality of boundaries 
between rooms, relating to privacy
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Spatially, the salon acts with connective properties between 
the hall and Margarethe’s private living room, and her private 
living room mediates access from the salon to her bedroom. 
The delayed accessibility into the private rooms is reminiscent of 
the difficulty of entering or inhabiting the visual impression of a 
physical space. Accessibility is an issue that blends the physical 
and spatial with language.
The use of various mechanical systems to achieve precise results 
is essential in the House. The metal runner between the inner 
and outer door leaves allowed the double-layered doors to open 
in both directions smoothly and seemingly weightlessly. The 
metal curtains for covering the windows are raised by a “precisely 
calculated counterweight … With the up and down movement 
of the opaque curtains, one gets a haptic feeling of light”52. The 
movement of these door and curtain mechanisms creates a 
temporal gesture by the architecture. A sense of time is brought 
into the building with the smooth motion of the vertical and 
horizontal sliding planes. Similarly, image forming is temporal; it 
is an action that occurs over time. The act of opening and closing 
can be likened to the forming of an image and conversely one 
can form an image of a blind or door opening and closing. While 
the visual room embodies these atmospheric attributes, recall 
that language too is a “spatial and temporal phenomenon”53. Just 
as architecture permits time and motion, so too are language 
52  Zou, H. (2005). “The Crystal Order that is Most Concrete: The 
Wittgenstein House.” Journal of Aesthetic Education 39(3). p. 27-8
53  Wittgenstein, L. (1953/2009). The Philosophical Investigations. West 
Sussex, UK, Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Paragraph 108
Figure 11
Metal runner between 
inner and outer door leaves
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and philosophy inextricably entangled with these properties. 
The visual room highlights the complexity of the philosophical 
problem of a private mental image and its dependence on our 
understanding of space.
The image forming process, a private psychological action, is 
the activity of construing visual impressions of objects in the 
real world. Wittgenstein’s philosophy of the image is bound to 
language when attempting to describe the concept, and now it is 
shown as bound to another formwork: the realm of architectural 
space. The aphorism of the visual room undergoes analyses of 
space and language, and in conjunction with the Stonborough-
Wittgenstein House it is evidence for the inseparable links of 
linguistics and space. The visual room is not a mere metaphor 
that is by chance a room; it is its spatial nature that lends 
itself to a description of imaging. Wittgenstein is describing 
philosophy within a blurred boundary of language and space. The 
characteristics of the visual room as an analogy for language are 
explored further in the Stonborough-Wittgenstein House, showing 
the spatial nature of language and philosophical problems. 
The visual room describes language, but it has its limits. What 
is beyond the limits of the visual room is described by the 
architecture of the House. Architecture, the physical construal 
of the spatial nature of language, is the perfect framework for a 
philosophy grounded in language. 
Figure 12
Metal curtain rising on 
mechanical system from floor
Figure 13
Top of curtain flush with 
floor when not in use
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Although his architecture is immediately recognisable by its 
distinct aesthetic, Loos’s architectural style was not driven by 
personal taste54. Architecture is the formwork for his highly 
developed arguments for civilized culture and sophisticated 
normative theories on how we should live. The Project for the 
House for Josephine Baker (1928) was designed by Loos but 
never realized. Baker, a popular cabaret singer, captivated Loos 
with his fascination for “cabaret culture and the extravagance 
of the music hall”55. However, his attraction to the exotic and 
erotic was the source of great ethical conflict for Loos, who wrote 
scathingly about the immorality of decadent bourgeois life. This 
violence between his theories for equality in culture and contact 
with the practical needs of society, and his purported indulgence 
in fin-de-siecle Viennese theatrical lifestyles is explored in his 
design for this unique house.
To understand his ethical argument for culture, Loos begins 
his 1910 essay Architecture by inviting the reader to imagine a 
lakeside scene, with mountains, trees, farmhouses and churches, 
in all its tranquility. He asks the reader to form an image of the 
scene, to which we can direct the questions of his critique56. 
“May I take you to the shores of a mountain lake? The sky is blue, 
the water is green, and everything is at peace. The mountains 
and the clouds are reflected in the lake, as are the houses, farms 
and chapels… 
54  Tournikiotis, P. (1991). Adolf Loos. New York, Princeton Architectural Press. p. 30
55 Jules-Rosette, B. (2007). Josephine Baker in Art and Life: The Icon and the Image. New York, Harper and Row. p. 150
56  The use of image forming to provide an example from which to philosophise is not altogether unlike Wittgenstein’s reliance on the image as the base of his 
critique of understanding. 
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“What is the discord, that like an unnecessary scream shatters the quiet? Right at the center of the farmers’ houses, 
which were not built by them, but by God, stands a villa... beauty, peace and quiet have been dispelled… why is it 
that every architect, good or bad, desecrates the lake?”57
Like Wittgenstein’s visual room, the lakeside scene is a metaphor, in this case for the stunted evolution of humanity 
caused by the uncivilized mimicry that is contemporary ornament. The villa in the scene represents ornamentation 
and its architect the culture-less urban dweller of Austria. Loos’s reputation as a writer or philosopher is secondary 
to his reputation as an architect. Hence, it is not surprising that his argument for an ethics of culture begins with 
an example involving architecture. However, it is the intent of this case study to show the significance architecture 
plays in forming Loos’s argument and how the design of his own villas display the inherent conflict in Loos’s 
critiques. 
When he goes on to write “the architect, like almost every urban dweller, has no culture… By culture I mean that 
balance of man’s inner and outer being which alone guarantees rational thought and action”58, Loos is referring to a 
dichotomy of inner and outer, interior and exterior, and form and content. There is a need for a resolution of modern 
man’s new way of thinking and his exterior appearance. While this dichotomy of inside and outside is introduced 
conceptually here, it has since been developed physically and spatially in Loos’s architecture throughout his 
career. In particular the House for Josephine Baker is an exploration of inner and outer, subject and object, and the 
voyeuristic gaze. 
The house in the lakeside scene is shown to be inconsistent with and detrimental to its surroundings; similarly the 
city-dweller is living without culture, “outside the spirit of their age”59. Loos is proposing that modern people should 
strive for authenticity in their lives. It is their responsibility to live in a civilized manner, which according to Loos is 
in the new American and British fashion. That way the culture of the city dweller will befit the recent advantages 
in technology, thought and dress, and this “authenticity” would spread to country people too. This concept of 
authenticity is shown through the use of the house in the example. The house similarly has a responsibility to 
57  Loos, A. (1910/2006). Architecture. Architecture and Design in Europe and America, 1750-2000. A. Harrison-Moore and D. C. Rowe. Oxford, Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd. p. 355
58  Ibid. p. 356
59  Tournikiotis, P. (1991). Adolf Loos. New York, Princeton Architectural Press. p. 29
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display authenticity. The house has this responsibility as it is in 
the public realm of life, as opposed to objects belonging in the 
private realm of life such as art60. This ontological distinction 
between the realms of public and private is a comment on 
the fundamental nature of things in the world, described by 
an architectural metaphor. Moreover, this concept is explored 
through the use of design in Loos’s houses. 
The tension between formal public space and private, intimate 
space is an important theme in Loos’s interiors. In the House for 
Josephine Baker, a grand stairway leads to a large salon, and a 
circular café is situated in the front corner of the house. These 
spaces are particularly open and public spaces, befitting the 
celebrity status of their patron. The central space however is a 
narrow hallway that follows the entire perimeter of a swimming 
pool, at the level beneath the pool’s surface. This is a very private 
space for the guest, or spectator, who would be hidden from a 
swimmer, yet the swimmer would be in full view of the onlooker. 
This is a more complex relationship between public and private 
than in most of Loos’s interiors due to the more public nature of 
his client, a showgirl. Her art, the movements she makes with her 
body, is not hidden in a separate poolroom; it is displayed in the 
center of the house, unashamedly, authentically.
Like Loos’s other interiors, the interior is not only designed for 
comfort but with an inherent psychological 
60  Frampton, K. (2002). In Spite of the Void: The Otherness of Adolf 
Loos. Labour, Work and Architecture: Collected Essays on Architecture and 
Design. K. Frampton. New York, Phaidon Press Ltd. p. 208
Figure 14
Section through House for 
Josephine Baker
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Figure 15
Plan of first floor of House 
for Josephine Baker
Figure 16
Diagram of clear, unclear 
and reflected views
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dimension61. With a swimming pool on the second floor and windows beneath its surface into a hall around the pool, 
it forms a sort of “underwater revue”62, reversing the roles of subject and object. 
Loos’s conception of the relationship between subject and object is clearly one of detachment, analogous to his 
self-proclaimed belief in the detachment of the exterior and the manifestation of richness and splendour of the 
interior in a building. This relationship could be extended to the conclusion that Loos values bodily experience of 
space over abstract mental concepts. He is essentially reversing the Cartesian view between “the perceptual and 
conceptual... [While] Descartes deprived the body of its status as the seat of valid and transmissible knowledge”63, 
Loos privileges the body as this reference point. In this case the seat or reference point of the subject is constantly 
displaced between the presumably male visitor and the female inhabitant.
Another reading of the lakeside scene image uncovers Loos’s apparent apotheosis of humble farmhouses, 
chapels and natural scenery. The farmer, the mason, the carpenter and the joiner do not desecrate the lake; the 
products of their labour are in tune with the spirit of the world. This is because these tradesmen are “only capable 
of building houses in the style of [their] time… he who had lost contact with his time, the one who was uprooted 
and remoulded, he became the dominant man, he was the architect”64. Here Loos is making a parallel between the 
architect and members of bourgeois society. The verisimilitude of the craftsmen is championed over the “masking…
[of] mediocrity”65 and misrepresentation of principles of the bourgeoisie. This conflict of grandeur and humbleness is 
a tension implicit in Loos’s philosophy, and explicitly explored in the House for Josephine Baker. 
Loos’s indictment of the bourgeois is not always as subtle as it is in his passage about the lakeside scene. In other 
publications he wrote “scathing, satirical reviews of Viennese society and cultural groups, diagnosing hypocrisy 
and cultural anachronism everywhere”66. The style of both the societal writings and the passage about the lakeside 
image, however, are written in the form of the Viennese feuilleton. This style of aphoristic prose is flamboyant 
61  Colomina, B. (1990). “Intimacy and Spectacle: The Interiors of Adolf Loos.” AA Files 20.
62  Ungers cited in Ibid. p. 10
63  Ibid. p. 11
64  Loos, A. (1910/2006). Architecture. Architecture and Design in Europe and America, 1750-2000. A. Harrison-Moore and D. C. Rowe. Oxford, Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd. p. 357
65  Tournikiotis, P. (1991). Adolf Loos. New York, Princeton Architectural Press. p. 24
66  Maciuika, J. V. (2000). “Adolf Loos and the Aphoristic Style: Rhetorical Practice in Early Twentieth-Century Design Criticism.” Design Issues 16(2). p. 79
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and easily lends itself to embellishment. His aphorisms, despite 
their self-effacing content, locate him amongst the intellectual 
milieu of his time, the educated and wealthy elite. His philosophy 
is grounded in a conflict of theatrical and anti-theatrical forces. 
The form and content of his aphorisms are in tension; while 
their content is filled with noble claims for an ethics of style, their 
form exposes Loos’s own situation amongst the privileged. This 
conflict is an essential theme in Loos’s interiors, especially in 
the House for Josephine Baker. While the exterior of the House 
is volumetrically simple, dichromatic and characteristically 
unadorned, the interior is extravagant and spectacular. 
“Architectural introversion”67 is a fundamental intention in the 
Baker House. The exterior gives no clues as to what the other 
sides of its walls are like. Although the project was never realized, 
we can read from the plans that once inside, one would be 
immediately confronted with the house’s highly suggestive and 
provocative imperatives. Not only are the spaces intended to 
be sensual, but there is also a “psychological dimension”68 to 
them. From the second floor, where the private rooms are, the 
inhabitant can see down to the grand staircase, overlooking the 
internal space that brings guests up to the first floor upon entry. 
This design move, characteristic of Loos’s interiors69, creates a 
67  Gravagnuolo, B. (1982). Adolf Loos: Theory and Works. New York, 
Rizzoli International Publications Ltd. p. 191
68  Colomina, B. (1990). “Intimacy and Spectacle: The Interiors of Adolf 
Loos.” AA Files 20. p. 5
69  Ibid. p. 8
Figure 17
The theatrical and extravagant interior of the Müller House, Prague
Figure 18
The detached and austere exterior of the Müller House
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theatre box inside the house70, where the inhabitants become 
spectators of the drama of guests arriving. Loos on occasion even 
refers to the inhabitant of architecture as the “spectator”71.  In 
turn, the guest may feel like a spectator too, as their eyes catch a 
glimpse of the most intimate spaces on the top floor through the 
atrium space. The inhabitant would begin to assume her role in 
this spectacle, feeling herself becoming an object for the gaze of 
others72. When the guests explore the narrow corridors of the first 
floor, they can see through the thick glass windows in the walls 
of the second floor swimming pool, with views from each side of 
the body swimming beneath its surface. This is the pinnacle of the 
theatre analogy, with the object, Baker, likely unable to make out 
the identities of the spectators due to the water over the glass and 
their access to all sides of the pool. Her location, in the pool, is 
centre stage. 
The consistent spatial detachment of the voyeur and the object 
of voyeurism is also significant as it “re-establish[es] the distance 
between critic and object of criticism, architect and building, 
70  This architectural device is used to differing degrees in Loos’s other 
houses, including the Müller House in Prague. The ‘theatre box’ in the Müller 
House is shown in the images here in absence of images of the unbuilt House 
for Josephine Baker
71  Loos, A. (1898). The Principle of Cladding. Spoken Into the Void: 
Collected Essays by Adolf Loos, 1897-1900. New York, MIT Press. p. 66
72  This notion of becoming the object for another’s gaze is reminiscent 
of Sartre’s passage concerning the ‘other’ making us aware of our own 
‘subjectness’. When Sartre’s character believes someone can see him listening 
in to another’s private conversation, he immediately becomes aware of his 
shame that otherwise was not there. This is discussed further later in the thesis.
Figure 19
Living room of the Müller House, Prague, designed by Loos. The internal 
aperture into the ‘theatre box’ ladies room is positioned above the entrance
Figure 20
Seating in the ‘theatre box’ ladies room, located 
around the view across the living room
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subject and object”73. Loos is the harshest critic of the culture of 
his contemporaries in Viennese society, yet he rejects that his 
own status is situated amongst theirs. He consistently distances 
himself from the society he criticises. Despite this rejection, 
Loos indulges in the design of highly theatrical architecture, 
with dramatic spaces and devices such as Baker’s swimming 
pool. The design for Baker’s House, with its formal exterior and 
theatrical interior, is analogous to Loos’s writing on the lakeside 
image. The content of his philosophy is a strictly analytical critique 
of culture, yet the form of his writing suggests an extravagant, 
theatrical critic.
Loos’s logic embodies his theory of culture and in turn his 
architectural method. Behind the austere facades and harsh 
criticisms lie interiors of theatricality. His theories are sophisticated 
and sensitive to circumstances of his time, however on the other 
side of their introverted walls lie a plethora of hyperbole and 
conflict. In the paper Architecture Loos writes about architecture 
and also about a normative ethical theory, the latter depending 
on the discourse of the former to make its point. His philosophy 
cannot be separated from its architectural language without losing 
its meaning. 
Like Wittgenstein, Loos appeals to the reader to conjure up 
an image and inspect its properties. The images are specific 
examples intended to corroborate concrete ideals. It is significant 
that the images they invoke are loaded with architectural 
language as they establish an ontological link between 
73  Colomina, B. (1992). The Split Wall: Domestic Voueurism. Sexuality & Space. B. Colomina. New York, Princeton Architectural Press. p. 35
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architecture and philosophy. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty was a contemporary of Sartre and likely 
influenced by Heidegger74. His seminal phenomenological work 
Phenomenology of Perception (1945) was written two years after 
Sartre’s Being and Nothingness75 (1943) and almost 20 years 
after Heidegger’s Being and Time76 and deals with similar themes 
like ‘being-in-the-world’. Perception, for Merleau-Ponty, is the key 
to understanding phenomena and our relationship to the world; 
only to Merleau-Ponty perception is mediated by the body, in “an 
holistic sense”77, in our involvement with the world. The body is 
an essential intermediary to gain a consistency of perception. 
Objects in the world are objects for a bodily gaze or grasp, and 
this phenomenal body structures the world of objects into figure-
ground type configurations to understand them78. 
These relationships have ramifications in the spatial realm and 
Merleau-Ponty refers specifically to space as forming a world 
around the locus that is the phenomenal body. He admits that 
the kind of space defined by ‘sensing’ is not the intellectual 
construction of space by some non-spatial ego defined by the 
Cartesian paradigm for describing three dimensions, but a special 
kind of spatiality. Reflection upon an action refers to 
74 Chaplin, A. D. (2001). Phenomenology: Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics. B. Grant and D. M. Lopes. Oxon, Routledge. p. 
167
75 Sartre, J.-P. (1943/1968). Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology. New York, Citadel Press.
76 Heidegger, M. (1927/1962). Being and Time. Oxford, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
77 Chaplin, A. D. (2001). Phenomenology: Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics. B. Grant and D. M. Lopes. Oxon, Routledge. p. 
167
78 Langer, M. M. (1989). Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception: A Guide and Commentary. London, The Macmillan Press Ltd. p. 83
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our intellectual sense of space, but pre-reflective existence, the existence encountered by bodily perception, occurs 
in a more primordial spatial realm. Pre-reflective experience of the world occurs in the primordial spatial realm in 
which “the body-subject fastens itself on to its environment”79. Merleau-Ponty’s example for this – what he calls a 
“spatiality of situation”80 – is the intrinsic ability to locate one’s body in space when casually smoking a pipe: “If I 
stand here holding my pipe in my closed hand, the position of my hand is not determined discursively by the angle 
which it makes with my forearm, and my forearm with my upper arm, and my upper arm with my trunk, and my trunk 
with the ground. I know indubitably where my pipe is, and thereby know where my hand and my body are”81. It is 
important to understand that this kind of engagement is pre-reflective, as it is different from analytical intentionality, 
where movement is abstracted from the “flow of engagement of a situation”82. Pre-reflective, bodily intentionality 
does not disrupt one’s engagement with a situation; it is a fundamental skill of the phenomenal body. It is significant 
that in his account of the phenomenal body Merleau-Ponty relies on a concept of spatiality, in this example our 
elemental haptic sense of locating a part of our bodies in space.
Steven Holl is considered by some theorists to be an architect who makes manifest the phenomenology of 
Merleau-Ponty in a “self-conscious philosophical program for his work”83. His work aims to capture the provocative 
and sensuous qualities of light, texture and colour to engage people with the architecture. Holl describes his 
intentions to enmesh architecture and phenomenology: “Phenomenology concerns the study of essences; 
architecture has the potential to put essences back into existence. By weaving form, space, and light, architecture 
can elevate the experience of daily life through the various phenomena that emerge from specific sites, 
programs, and architectures”84. It has been argued, however, that Holl’s work is “less concerned with manifesting 
phenomenological architecture and more concerned with what he defines as perceptual phenomena’”85. August 
79  Ibid. p. 85
80  Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945/1962). Phenomenology of Perception. Paris, Gallimard. p. 115
81  Ibid. p. 115
82  August, K. (2008). The Thinking Body: A study of the architectural ramifications of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s rendering of the human body’s capacities”. 
School of Architecture. Wellington, Victoria University of Wellington. p. 50
83  Perez-Gomez, A. (1996). Introduction. Intertwining: Steven Holl Selected Projects 1989-1995. S. Holl. New York, Princeton Architectural Press. p. 9
84  Holl, S. (1996). Intertwining. New York, Princeton Architectural Press. p. 11
85  August, K. (2008). The Thinking Body: A study of the architectural ramifications of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s rendering of the human body’s capacities”. 
School of Architecture. Wellington, Victoria University of Wellington. p. 67
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argues that Holl’s emphasis on phenomena such as light, 
colour and materiality is not sufficient for a Merleau-Pontian 
justification for his program. By aligning himself with Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology and at the same time referring to 
‘intentions’ as “existences of mental phenomena”86, Holl reveals 
a misinterpretation or at least over-simplification of Merleau-
Ponty’s pre-reflective, bodily engagement with phenomena. The 
phenomenal body concept offers an account of spatiality that may 
be more appropriate and valuable to architecture than his more 
visual characteristics alone.
This case study examines Holl’s architecture, in particular the 
Residence for the Swiss Ambassador in Washington, rather than 
his written work, for manifestations of Merleau-Ponty’s spatial 
phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty explains the notion of bodily 
engagement with phenomena in the image he describes of his flat 
in Phenomenology of Perception:
“When I walk around my flat, the various aspects in which it 
presents itself to me could not possibly appear as views of one 
and the same thing if I did not know that each of them represents 
the flat seen from one spot or another, and if I were unaware 
of my own movements, and of my body as retaining its identity 
through the stages of those movements. I can of course take a 
mental bird’s eye view of the flat, visualize it or draw a plan of it 
on paper, but in that case too I could not grasp the unity of the 
86  Holl, S. (2006). Questions of perception: Phenomenology of 
architecture. Questions of perception: Phenomenology of architecture. S. 
Holl, J. Pallasmaa and A. Perez-Gomez. San Francisco, USA, William Stout 
Publishers. p. 42
Figure 21
Residence for the Swiss Ambassador, 
Washington, designed by Steven Holl
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object without the mediation of bodily experience, for what I call a plan is only a more comprehensive perspective: it 
is the flat ‘seen from above’, and the fact that I am able to draw together in it all habitual perspectives is dependent 
on my knowing that one and the same embodied subject can view successively from various positions”87
Here ‘space’ (Merleau-Ponty’s home) is being described as the synthesis of the spatial situations encountered by 
the body. The body’s engagement with physical space as a means of understanding is a more appropriate focus for 
architecture in this passage than the total reliance on sensory qualities such as light and colour. From this passage 
we can establish a set of criteria less superficial than those mentioned by Holl and examine the ramifications for 
space. Characteristics that can be applied to the spatial qualities of the building are the architecture’s manipulation 
or engaging of the body, the uninterrupted affordance of space, and the use of objects indeterminate without human 
engagement88. August applies criteria like these to Carlo Scarpa’s architecture, however Holl’s work intertwines 
these spatial concepts despite the shortcomings of his theoretical justifications.
The flat and its “various aspects” are encountered as it “presents itself to me”. This suggests that the architecture 
acts on the body; the body is the subject for space. Recall that this kind of spatiality is a pre-reflective spatiality 
for Merleau-Ponty, as when the flat presents itself to him, his body acts instinctively or primordially to the space 
around it. Just as it did in the pipe example, the phenomenal body possesses the fundamental skill of locating itself 
in space. The space engages the phenomenal body, forces it to try to understand its spatial situation, but not in a 
conscious analytical way that the mind understands a situation, but with a bodily understanding. The first criterion 
for an architecture describing this kind of spatiality then is the ability to manipulate the body through space or 
engage the conscious body with the space. 
When Merleau-Ponty describes his ability to imagine the flat from all of its different visual and non-visual 
perspectives, it is only possible because he knows that he has experienced it bodily from various positions. Looking 
at its various aspects proves nothing about the nature of the space, however after experiencing it as the embodied 
subject one can understand it. The continuity of bodily intentionality, without abstraction or disruption of the flow of 
bodily experience, is necessary for experiencing the space. Purely visual abstractions of space, such as the birds-
87  Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945/1962). Phenomenology of Perception. Paris, Gallimard. p. 235
88  August, K. (2008). The Thinking Body: A study of the architectural ramifications of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s rendering of the human body’s capacities”. 
School of Architecture. Wellington, Victoria University of Wellington. p. 72-86
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eye view, architectural drawings or the view from a particular 
perspective, fail to grasp the unity of the space that only an 
embodied subject can appreciate through continuous occupation 
of and movement through the space. Spatially, architecture can 
allude to this kind of bodily intentionality through the continuous 
affordance of space. This is the next criterion for an architecture 
pertaining to the phenomenal body.
When walking around a flat, we cannot make sense of what we 
are experiencing if we are “unaware of [our] own movements, 
and of [our] body retaining its identity through the stages of 
those movements”. We are constantly aware of our movements, 
even if we do not consider we are thinking about what we 
are doing, because we are moving with our body. Bodily 
intentionality and movement is essential to one’s identity even, 
as one is always aware of the position of one’s body, despite not 
being able to describe it geometrically. This is why instigating 
movement is necessary to engage with space. Architecture is 
responsible for initiating movement by prompting engagement 
with the architecture. Spaces with objects or features that are 
indeterminate without human engagement instigate movement 
in a space. This is another factor against which we can analyse 
architecture dealing with Merleau-Pontian spatiality.
The Residence for the Swiss Ambassador in Washington, 
designed by Steven Holl, employs tactics to manipulate the 
user’s movement through the space. The cruciform plan, referring 
to the Swiss icon, is disrupted by forcing a diagonal line of 
movement through the building for guests inhabiting the more 
Figure 22
Plan of ground floor of Residence for Swiss Ambassador, Washington
Figure 23
Diagram with green arrows showing large feature doors between public 
spaces and red arrows showing small doors through to private spaces, 
manipulating the body through space
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public part of the house89. Being an ambassadorial residence 
the house dedicates around half of its floor space to the hosting 
of guests, and this invisible diagonal line subtly guides their 
occupation. While this line is not visible, its path is defined by the 
over-sized doors that open the way through the corners of the 
orthogonal rooms. The user is drawn through the space by this 
gesture. This is how the architecture engages the body of the 
user, manipulating its direction through an otherwise wide-open 
rectilinear space. 
The architecture attempts to engage guests in the public part of 
the house by using a series of apertures. In this part of the house 
doors are enlarged panels in the walls, some of which pivot on 
a hinge not on their edge. These doors force users to actively 
understand the movement of the door with their bodies. They 
instigate movement through space by engaging the body with the 
motion of swinging or sliding the large veneered door leaves.
The continuous affordance of space is expressed in the house 
to facilitate bodily intentionality. To avoid abrupt spatial moments 
the stairs, for example, protrude by one large square step and 
a half out from behind the wall concealing them. This move has 
the stairs flowing both down to the ground and spilling out into 
the large hall space. This creates an affording of space that 
establishes a more continuous flow up the stairs, rather than the 
abrupt revelation of the stairs that would occur if they were hidden 
entirely behind the wall.
89  Holl, S. (2007). House: Black Swan Theory. New York, Princeton 
Architectural Press. p. 23
Figure 24
Residence for Swiss Ambassador manipulates the body 
of the user by drawing them across space diagonally
Figure 25
Large sliding and pivoting doors instigate 
bodily movement in the space
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By using Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy to inform the spaces in 
the house rather than just the textures and light that define the 
exterior of the house, Holl has intertwined phenomenology and 
architecture. Space is configured to engage the phenomenal body 
with its spatial situation. In plan the building appears to be a very 
large house with an visually symbolic floor plan. Inhabitation of 
the spaces however appeals to the phenomenal body’s ability 
to understand space through its innate skill of assessing its own 
spatial situation. The house, with its relatively unconventional 
and unfamiliar layout, employs architectural devices to engage 
and manipulate the body through its continuous arrangement of 
spaces. The affordance of space in the house implies that when 
experienced through continuous embodied occupation one can 
better understand a sense of the Merleau-Pontian spatiality of 
situation. 
Figure 26
The stairs extend into the hall space 
creating a continuous affordance of space
36
These case studies show, in the first case how a philosopher has 
used architecture to develop philosophy; in the second case how 
philosophy and architecture have been used concurrently; and 
in the last case how an architect has used philosophy to develop 
architecture. They are all examples that show a resonating link 
between the two disciplines. Significantly, passages about the 
forming of an image have been used to examine the spatial 
qualities of a philosophical aphorism. In each case, a reference to 
a space provides us with philosophical text that uses architectural 
language in discussing a philosophical concept. It is significant 
that the concepts are discussed using spatial metaphor, as the 
relationships between philosophical concepts are spatial. The 
spatial nature of architecture allows it to be used as the medium 
for reworking these concepts, and similarly philosophy is exploited 
for its phenomenological nature to provide essential meaning to 
spaces. 
It is logical that these three houses are examined for a 
philosophical interpretation given that the designers have all 
operated within the realm of philosophy. Wittgenstein and Loos, in 
early 20th Century Vienna, designed their respective houses with 
more concern for their own theoretical interpretations of the world 
than in line with any pre-existing style. At the time of building their 
houses were not “belonging to a particular architectural tradition 
[or] as independent of any extra-disciplinary influences”90. Neither 
building is trying to engage people through stylistic references or 
aesthetics; they “ignore the arbitrary dictates of style”91. Nothing 
90  Paden, R. (2007). Mysticism and Architecture: Wittgenstein and the Meanings of the Palais Stonborough. Plymouth, Lexington Books. p. 36
91  Ibid. p. 55
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in the interiors of their houses was applied in an arbitrary or inappropriate manner. Similarly, Holl is not merely a 
follower in some architectural tradition or striving to fit into an established style. His aim is to “explore architecture as 
more than just an aesthetic undertaking”92. An approach to looking at these houses from the standpoint of modern 
philosophy is entirely appropriate. Moreover, looking at modern philosophy from the realm of architecture can create 
spaces informed by the essences of existence and the relationships between body, mind and world.
Elizabeth Grosz, exploring philosophy and architecture from ‘outside’, argues that because the disciplines are 
exclusive, they must interact within a third space, outside of them both93. Rather than submitting one discipline 
to the demands and constraints of the other, they must be explored adjacently, one feeding the other instead 
of allowing one to dominate the other. I propose that a more “productive interchange”94 that Grosz suggests 
but doesn’t define would involve the simultaneous exploration of the rigour of philosophical investigation and 
phenomenological concepts, with the architectonic manipulation of space. Philosophical concepts that suggest 
spatial relationships can feed architecture but the architecture must always provide something more, something 
of its own that poses philosophical questions. Grosz asks what the place of philosophy is in architecture, or that 
of architecture in philosophy. Projects that come the closest to answering this question are those that rethink 
architecture, that are “in part about thinking, about how to think, to think while making or rather while doing: to 
think as doing”95. It is significant that what Grosz is suggesting is not a solution but a method for thinking and doing 
architecture, a realm where philosophy and architecture operate co-dependently.
Operating within a fabric of philosophical aphorisms and architectural space, the boundaries between the two are 
indistinguishable. The next chapter will endeavour to examine the philosophy of a modern philosopher who never 
associated himself with architecture, but due to his work in phenomenology deserves a place in this new realm. 
Jean-Paul Sartre was concerned with concrete essences and the nature of existence; concepts, it is argued here, 
with a spatial grounding. By extracting spatial relationships from the text to use for design, this project is rebuilding 
Sartre’s philosophy as an architecturalisation of space. The implications for such an architecture that expounds 
theories of consciousness and existence is the creation of spaces in which we can rethink about philosophy.
92  Gannon, T. (2004). Steven Holl: Simmons Hall. New York, Princeton Architectural Press. p. 11
93  Grosz, E. (2001). Architecture from the Outside. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press.
94  Ibid. p. xvi
95  Ibid. p. 58
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In the second half of the 20th Century Sartre was described as 
being not the greatest philosopher of our time, but the “only 
philosopher of our time”96. He is a philosopher associated with 
existentialism and phenomenology, as well as a writer of novels, 
plays and political theory. His literature, much like his life, is 
based on the themes of his philosophy; philosophy was how 
he lived his life. His most significant works, aligning him with 
existentialism and phenomenology, were The Transcendence of 
the Ego  (1937), The Imaginary (1940), Being and Nothingness 
(1943), Existentialism is a Humanism (1946), and Critique 
of Dialectical Reason (1960). His early influences were 
phenomenologists Hegel and Husserl, as well as Heidegger’s 
ontology of existence97. He claimed he would rather read 
detective novels than the analytic philosophy of Wittgenstein98. 
He was a contemporary of Merleau-Ponty and in fact knew him 
personally as they shared the same social circle of intellectuals 
in Paris at the time99. A recurring philosophical concern in his 
philosophy and literature was consciousness: consciousness of 
the self, of others, of things in the world, of being, and imaginary 
consciousness. Consciousness, for Sartre, is not an object that 
can know itself. “Is there room for an ‘I’ in such consciousness? 
...evidently not”100.
96  Cumming, R. D. (1965). Introduction. The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. R. D. Cumming. New York, Random House. p. 46
97  Ibid. p. 24
98  Ibid. p. 2
99  de Beauvoir, S., Ed. (1983). Witness to My Life: The Letters of Jean-Paul Sartre to Simone de Beauvoir 1926-1939. Hammondsworth, England, Penguin 
Books. p. 151
100  Sartre, J.-P. (1937). The Transcendence of the Ego. Paris, France, Gallimard. p. 41
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Sartre’s theories of consciousness, self, objects, the image 
and the body have implications for space. The nature of these 
issues entails spatial relationships between their concepts. The 
language Sartre uses suggests they are related spatially, and it 
is significant that such descriptions cannot be explained without 
spatial parameters. Philosophy need not be considered as merely 
concrete descriptions of our interactions with the world, it is an 
active production of deductions and criticisms, a “process of 
making... arguments, propositions, discourses”101. The philosophy 
of Sartre is not provided here as the philosophy with connections 
to architecture, as many philosophers have been associated 
with architectural theory. Rather, Sartre’s philosophy constructs 
propositions and situations for contemplation and these situations 
can feed architectural space just as architectural space offers a 
location in which to understand them.
To introduce Sartre’s conception of consciousness, we can 
refer to his comparison of it with Descartes’ renowned maxim: 
cogito ergo sum, or ‘I think therefore I am’102. Sartre challenges 
Descartes’ identity of I and think. He is not doubting that we 
exist in the world, or commenting about sceptism or realism, as 
Descartes was when he posited this statement. Sartre rejects 
the phrase I think as it is a phrase that can only ever be claimed 
through reflective consciousness, not the kind of consciousness 
that is actually thinking. While reflecting on thinking, or reflecting 
on, for example, drawing, we refer to an I: I was thinking or I am 
drawing. The consciousness we are referring to when we think 
101  Grosz, E. (2001). Architecture from the Outside. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. p. 5
102  Descartes, R. (1644/2007). Principles of Philosophy. Whitefish, USA, Kessinger Publishing. p. 18
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this does not contain an I however, at the time of thinking or drawing I am in a “world of objects [such as the lines I 
draw, the objects I am drawing]; it is they which constitute the unity of my consciousness... I have disappeared”103. 
The problem is that we are referring to a concept that we call I that manifests itself as the source of our 
consciousness. This I, or the ego, Sartre argues, is not an inhabitant of consciousness. By synthesizing selective 
acts, one’s consciousness constructs an ego or sense of self. However, consciousness knows itself only as 
inwardness, the ego transcends it.
The example Sartre draws to portray this unreflected consciousness is set in daily life, in the world:
“When I run after a streetcar, when I look at the time, when I am absorbed in contemplating a portrait, there is 
no I. There is consciousness of the streetcar-having-to-be-overtaken, etc., and non-positional consciousness 
of consciousness. In fact, I am then plunged into the world of objects; it is they which constitute the unity of my 
consciousnesses; it is they which present themselves with values, with attractive and repellent qualities – but me, 
I have disappeared; I have annihilated myself. There is no place for me on this level. And this is not a matter of 
chance, due to a momentary lapse of attention, but happens because of the very structure of consciousness”104.
He is portraying the world as containing consciousnesses acting in a world of objects, yet it is the objects that unite 
my consciousnesses, there is no reference point that is me that unites them. If someone asked what I was doing 
when contemplating the portrait, I could tell them, and the word I is useful syntactically.  However, for the concept I, 
the ego, as soon “as I turn my gaze toward it and try to reach it... it vanishes”105. This is because of the nature of the 
transcendental ego.
Caillois terms this lack of distinction between the milieu and the subject the “depersonalisation by assimilation to 
space”106 and likens it to the experience of the psychotic person. The psychotic person’s thoughts are separate from 
their body and fill the space around them. They abandon themselves as the focal point in space, abandon their 
locality as themselves for themselves, and the barrier between their ego and the world is “ever permeable, suffused 
103  Sartre, J.-P. (1937). The Transcendence of the Ego. Paris, France, Gallimard. p. 49
104  Ibid. p. 49
105  Ibid. p. 88
106  Caillois, R. (1987). Mimicry and Legendary Psychasthenia. October: The First Decade, 1976-1986. A. Michelson, R. Krauss, D. Crimp and J. Copjec. 
Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. p. 72
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not only by objects but by spatiality itself”107.
This concept of the depersonalisation of space, the loss of 
the self as a reference point in space, is the driver for my 
process of designing in orthographic drawings such as sections 
and axonometrics. These kinds of drawings are from a non-
perspectival view, a depersonalised reference point. When we 
refer to ourselves as I, for example when we say I am standing 
by the window, we are anchoring our own subjectivity in our 
body, in a particular position in space, in relation to other objects. 
This anchoring of our subjectivity is what creates our identity as 
I. From this position, we have a particular perspective on the 
world, from the reference point of our person. In the technical 
architectural drawing, this union of a subjectivity and location 
of body in space does not exist. The space of the orthographic 
drawing is considered analytically as a sum of points in space, 
without the reference point I appearing in an effort to describe it. 
The dependence on an identity or ego located in the space has 
disappeared.
Now it may seem impossible to consider the ego, if it is really just 
a unity of all my consciousnesses. If the ego is transcendental, 
then why am I compelled to refer to it as my identity and situate 
it in my body? When I occupy space, I am sometimes vividly 
aware of my experience of the space. This is because there is a 
viewpoint from which we can view the self, and that is from the 
viewpoint of others. Just as our consciousness selects 
107  Callois in Grosz, E. (2001). Architecture from the Outside. 
Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press. 
Figure 27
Orthographic drawings are read 
analytically as a sum of points in space
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actions consistent with one another from the past to falsely construct an ego or sense of self, so is our sense 
of self given to us by other people treating us as objects rather than pure consciousnesses. We get the most 
vivid and compelling sense of ourselves when we see ourselves in the eyes of others108. Just as fundamental 
to human reality as the being-for-itself of consciousness, is being-for-others. The ‘look’ of others turns the act of 
consciousness from acting pre-reflectively at objects to acting reflectively at oneself as an object. We realise, when 
being looked at, that we are what others see us as. Sartre’s example is of shame when caught eavesdropping 
behind a door:
“Let us imagine that moved by jealousy, curiosity, or vice I have just glued my ear to the door and looked through 
a keyhole. I am alone and on the level of a non-thetic self-consciousness. This means first of all that there is 
no self to inhabit my consciousness, nothing therefore to which I can refer my acts in order to qualify them…My 
consciousness clings to my acts, it is my acts; and my acts are commanded only by the ends to be attained and by 
the instruments to be employed. My attitude, for example, has no ‘outside’… But suddenly I hear footsteps in the 
hall. Someone is looking at me!… I now exist as myself for my unreflective consciousness. This irruption of the self 
has often been described: I see myself because somebody sees me”109
In this example, I am acting without directing my attention towards the way I am acting. My consciousness is 
focused on what I am doing without reflecting upon itself and judging my actions. It is only when another person 
sees me – or even when I become aware of someone possibly seeing me, such as when I am disturbed by the 
sound of footsteps approaching – do I turn my attention to what I am doing, and the I appears only now. The gaze 
of the other, whether directly visually or indirectly alluded to, objectifies me and forces me to look at myself, as a 
self. 
This description, of discovering I am an object under the gaze of the other, suggests spatial configurations of being 
caught by another’s gaze. Architecture can create moments where its inhabitants are manipulated so as to become 
in view of other inhabitants. Sartre’s example, located in perhaps the hallway of a house, on the other side of a door 
from an inhabited space, produces an image of conventional architecture. This can be extended to spaces where 
108  Detmer, D. (2008). Sartre Explained: from Bad Faith to Authenticity. Illinois, Carus Publishing Company. p. 92
109  Sartre, J.-P. (1943/1968). Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology. New York, Citadel Press. p. 235
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Figure 28
Architecture can 
manipulate inhabitants 
into the gaze of another
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one is manipulated into the gaze of the other110. In generating 
space synonymous with the concept of being-for-others, the 
presence of the other is instrumental in forcing the user to reflect 
upon his or her actions and providing him or her with a sense 
of self. The architectural device of manipulating inhabitants into 
the gaze of others is used throughout the design component of 
this thesis. Overhead balconies and internal apertures create 
possibilities of being caught in another’s gaze. 
Caillois’s ‘depersonalisation of space’ is reversed under the 
look of the other. The subject regains their right to occupy a 
perspectival point and is located as themselves again, from the 
point of view of the other and their own consciousness. The ego 
is returned to the body and the barriers between self and outside 
space present themselves. Space becomes organised around 
the focal point of the subject, rather than one of many focuses of 
consciousnesses acting in a world of objects.
Another important part of knowing about our own and others’ 
existence is due to the role of the body and its relationship 
to objects in the world. For Sartre, the body is united with 
consciousness and it would be “in vain to suppose that the soul 
can detach itself from this individualization by separating itself 
from the body at death or by pure thought, for the soul 
110	 	This	is	reminiscent	of	Adolf	Loos’s	use	of	changes	in	floor	level	
between the positions of subject and the object in his interiors. His theme of the 
theatre,	as	well	as	suggestions	of	surveillance,	creates	spaces	forcing	users	into	
the gaze of the other.
Figure 29
I see myself when 
someone else sees me
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is the body”111. This is an ontological claim for an embodied consciousness. Significantly, Sartre’s account is the 
most comprehensive account of the body in phenomenology with the exception of Merleau-Ponty’s, and Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology has always rested heavily on the basis of Sartre’s writing112. Rather than trying to discover 
a place where mind and body interact, Sartre describes the body as “lived and not known”113. He examines the body 
from two ontological points of view: the body as it is for the person himself or herself and the body as it appears for 
others.
The body as it is for the person himself/herself is the instrumental body. The body is not an object we use to 
gain knowledge of the physical world, it is the manifestation of our selfness and how instrumental things relate 
themselves to us. The world of objects is an infinite number of systems of instrumentality that always refer back to 
the body. The spatial connotations of the body for-itself are of the body as a centre of reference for objects in the 
world. 
The second ontological condition of the body that Sartre proposes is the body as it appears to others. As well as 
the body being-for-itself, the body exists for-others. We can understand how our body is for-others by realising 
how others’ bodies are for us. Recall how the look of the other made us into an object, confirmed a misguided 
conception of our self when seen through the eyes of the other. Just as his/her gaze objectified us, we objectify 
the body of the other. However, on close examination we do not conceive of the other as merely a thing among 
other things in the world, but as an object with a subjective point of view. We accept that the other has a character, 
based on past behavioural patterns from which we draw conclusions about his/her personality. His/her bodily 
actions provide this past and the potential ways he will act in the future, thus consisting his character, and qualify 
him/her with the point of view we grant him/her. And just as we are the point of reference for potential systems of 
instrumentality, the other is the centre of an instrumental complex, a consciousness from whose standpoint meaning 
is given to the other objects in the room114. 
111 Sartre, J.-P. (1943/1968). Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology. New York, Citadel Press. p. 310
112  Barnes, H. E. (1999). Sartre and Feminism: Aside from The Second Sex and All That. Feminist Interpretations of Jean-Paul Sartre.	J.	S.	Murphy.	University	
Park,	PA,	The	Pennsylvania	State	University	Press.	p.	36
113 Sartre, J.-P. (1943/1968). Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology. New York, Citadel Press. p. 324
114  Detmer, D. (2008). Sartre Explained: from Bad Faith to Authenticity. Illinois, Carus Publishing Company. 
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Figure 30
The body is a centre of 
reference for objects in the 
Figure 31 (opposite page)
Objects in the home refer to 
the person who lives there as a 
subject, not just another object
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“This room in which I wait for the master of the house reveals 
itself to me in its totality the body of its owner: this easy chair 
is a chair-where-he-sits, this desk is a desk-at-which-he-writes, 
this window is a window through which there enters the light-
which-illuminates-the-objects-which-he-sees. Thus it is an outline 
complete with all its parts, and this outline is an outline-of-an-
object; an object can come at every instant to fill the outline with 
content. But still the master of the house ‘is not there’. He is 
elsewhere; he is absent”115 
All of the objects in the home refer to the subjectivity of the person 
who lives there. Their meaning is reliant on the interests of this 
other person. Our encounter with another person is an encounter 
with a consciousness, a centre of reference, which arranges 
objects in the world according to its own subjective interests and 
uses. Spatially, this evokes a sense of all things in or aspects of 
a room being directed at another point of reference, other than 
one’s own body. Furniture, objects used or held by part of a 
person’s body, and spaces designed to the scale of the human 
body refer to the existence of the other, another subjectivity. We 
do not need to see another person to know that they, as both a 
body and consciousness, exist, we need only see objects and 
architectural features that refer to their interaction. This is an 
important concept for design, and sketched initially in figure 31.
In addition to seeing objects as referring to another subjectivity in 
the world, interacting with another’s corporeality, objects interact 
115  Sartre, J.-P. (1943/1968). Being and Nothingness: A 
Phenomenological Essay on Ontology. New York, Citadel Press. p. 317-8
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with the body. As the body interacts with the world, it interacts 
with objects in the world, including architecture. It feels the affects 
of the ‘coefficient of adversity’116 of things: the resistance of 
objects to the instrumentality of the body. The adversity of objects 
will always extend back to the body as a centre of reference: 
something is not heavy unless it is heavy for the body to pick 
up; the fire is not threatening unless it threatens the house, 
which impacts on the body. Architecture impacts on the body 
and therefore has the ability to create this sense of adversity. 
Architectural features act as objects in the sense that they can 
have a certain level of resistance to the body. Objects in the world 
are not encountered by the body; rather they indicate themselves 
to the body. 
“it is in relation to an original instrumental complex that things 
reveal their resistance and their adversity. The bolt is revealed 
as too big to be screwed into the nut; the pedestal too fragile to 
support the weight which I want to hold up, the stone too heavy to 
be lifted up to the top of the wall, etc.”117
Objects present themselves to the body with all their resistance 
and adversity that we see relevant in them. This adversity we find 
in objects, the frustration we can encounter at their resistance 
to our intention for them, is significant in our knowing of our 
existence. The less objects or architecture display this resistance 
116  A term Sartre uses, borrowed from Bachelard in Bachelard, G. 
(1942/1983). Water and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Matter. 
Cambridge, Pegasus Foundation.
117  Sartre, J.-P. (1943/1968). Being and Nothingness: A 
Phenomenological Essay on Ontology. New York, Citadel Press. p. 301
Figure 32
A step too high too climb, a chair 
too close to the edge of a ledge. This 
adversity is how architectural features 
indicate themselves to the body
Figure 33
(opposite page)
Concept drawing:
Rethinking architecture and 
rebuilding philosophy
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to the body, the less impact they have on our corporeality and 
the less we would notice things that point out our very existence 
to us. Spatially this example can be extended to a hallway that is 
wide enough to be a hallway but too narrow to carry something 
through, a step that is too high to casually climb, an opening to 
look through that is too short to move through. Existentially, one is 
directly faced with the realities of existence when confronted with 
discomfort and struggle. This idea is portrayed in figure 32.
It is these significant ontological conditions and relationships in 
Sartre’s writing that drive the design component of this thesis. 
The transcendent ego and the depersonalisation of space, the 
relationship between the self and others, and the role of the body 
and objects in the world, are investigated spatially in the design of 
a House for Sartre. Recall that philosophy has been described as 
a process of constructing propositions. Thinking philosophically is 
building on knowledge and revealing the structure behind the way 
we think. For philosophy and architecture to operate together with 
an inseparable bond, architecture is a tool for constructing such 
propositions. The realm Grosz describes where we must rethink 
architecture, rethink it as doing or making, is the realm in which 
philosophy and architecture can operate together. Rethinking 
and rebuilding on Sartre’s philosophy of self, while at the same 
time rethinking and rebuilding the architecture of the house, 
a domestic space, is the aim of part 3 of this thesis. Through 
design of the house, Sartre’s philosophy is explored further, 
pushing the limits of his descriptions and testing his examples in 
the tangible realm of architecture. Through inhabitation of such 
an architecture, one may gain a better understanding of this 
philosophy.
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Part 3
Design
Chapter 7
The House
Concepts central to Sartre’s phenomenology have been extracted 
from his writing and analysed for the connotations they have 
for space. The role of design in this project is to further explore 
these concepts through architecture, a discipline dealing 
with physical space rather than philosophical space, and the 
foundational metaphor of transcendental phenomenology. It is 
through representation of three-dimensional spaces (using plans, 
sections and axonometric drawings) that Sartre’s phenomenology 
is explored. The resulting design, of a three-dimensional space, 
is space where his philosophy can be experienced. By inhabiting 
such an architecture, one can better gain an understanding of 
the nature of experience and the essence of the physical and 
metaphysical world. 
This part of the thesis will begin with brief descriptions of the 
programme, site and representational method for the design 
component. Then the resulting design for ‘A House for Sartre’ 
will be presented. Finally, the design of particular spaces in the 
‘house’ will be documented by way of experiential accounts of 
the design and philosophy integral to the spaces. The form of the 
first person account will read like an example written by Sartre, 
Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty or Loos, like the description of an 
image or a spatial metaphor describing a philosophical concept. 
I hope to discover firstly that architecture generated by Sartre’s 
philosophy communicates his essential concepts to the user. 
Secondly, through the descriptive accounts of spaces in the 
building, I expect the architecture to propogate philosophical text.
Returning to the case studies in Part 1, the programme of the 
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Figure 34
Concept drawing
The house offers both concepts of 
domesticity, such as privacy and 
boundaries, and objects of 
domesticity, such as furniture
‘house’ was used by both Wittgenstein and Holl to embody their 
philosophical intentions. The house offers itself as an armature 
on which to project analytical propositions, yet at the same time 
it formalises the subject’s experience of the propositions. The 
house, for Wittgenstein, offered an open programme with which 
he could explore his philosophical problems, as well as domestic 
boundaries, which in turn influenced his philosophical claims.
Likewise for Holl, the house is shaped by the ‘phenomenal 
body’ of Merleau-Ponty’s writing, yet at the same time the 
considerations of the domestic setting provide the substance 
with which to formalise the experience of the body. Domestic 
boundaries such as public and private space, subject and object, 
and the voyeuristic gaze can be dealt with in the house, both 
spatially and visually. 
Bachelard and Heidegger privilege the house or dwelling 
respectively as both an emotionally and ontologically significant 
place118. Home is both something we inhabit and something that 
inhabits us. The home is significant as it represents human space, 
the space of the self, and the “relationship between Home and 
Ego, meanwhile, borders on identity”119. The house, as ‘self’, is an 
opportunity to explore Sartre’s philosophy of the self, the ego, and 
the boundaries associated with it in his work.
118  In The Poetics of Space Bachelard links representational spaces 
with the intimate and absolute space that is the house. Objects and elements 
in the house are paralleled with their ontological equivalent – drawers, chests 
and wardrobes are compared with nests, shells and corners – the latter being 
associated with our cardinal sense of inhabiting.
119 Lefebvre, H. (1974/1991). The Production of Space. Oxford, 
Blackwell Publishers. p. 121
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Rather than a single residence, the brief for this project is for a 
set of four apartments. The existence of other people is so central 
to Sartrean phenomenology that the presence of neighbouring 
occupants was exploited, with the design privileging a variety of 
standpoints throughout the apartment building. Moments in the 
building where the existence of other people is felt are in tension 
with our expectations for domestic space. The expression of co-
existence through the apartments’ tendencies to impinge on one 
another’s space will be further defined in the existential accounts.
In order to provide a physical context for the project, a site was 
chosen at 42 Rue Bonaparte, Paris. A corner site, it is currently 
occupied by a six-storey building housing Le Bonaparte café and 
a retail store at ground level, and residential apartments on the 
upper floors. The building, in Saint-Germain-des-Prés, in the 16th 
arrondissement, is significant as Sartre resided in an apartment 
on the fourth floor from 1946 to 1962120. His occupancy here was 
the longest time he ever lived in his own home, as for most of his 
adult life he resided in hotels. The view from his study “looked 
across the cobblestone square to the old church, the terrace of 
the Deux Magots, [a café he, Simone de Beauvoir and many 
Parisian intellectuals and artists frequented] and right up the 
Rue de Rennes”121. The interior of his apartment was destroyed 
in 1962 by a plastic explosive thrown through a window as an 
act of hostility against Sartre and his political views at the time 
120 Rowley, H. (2005). Tête-a-Tête: Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul 
Sartre. New York, HarperCollins. p. 164
121 Ibid. p. 164
Figure 36
(opposite page)
Site Plan
Figure 35
Existing building at 
42 Rue Bonaparte, Paris
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(although no one was home to be injured)122. The building is a 
pre-Haussmann structure, with stone street facades following the 
strict ornamental constraints of Paris at the time. 
Due to these historical factors, the intervention of this project has 
been predominantly confined to the interior and the upper floors. 
The ground floor café, retail store and entrance to the apartments’ 
central courtyard have been retained so as not to disturb the 
strict adherence the street level frontages have to their context. 
The exception to this is where three important internal spaces 
protrude through the existing façade and hang from their roofs 
to the existing external walls. From the exterior, one gets the 
impression of something happening in these transparent pods 
suspended above the street, they hint at the interiority of what is 
behind the glass. In his description of the self, Sartre refers to a 
consciousness of “absolute inwardness”, forcing him to conclude, 
“one lives interiority... that one ‘exists inward’... for absolute 
interiority never has an outside... It is too much present for one 
to succeed in taking a truly external viewpoint on it. If we step 
back for vantage, the me accompanies us in this withdrawal. It is 
infinitely near, and I cannot circle around it”123. This description 
is rich in spatial metaphor. Interiority suggests the existence of 
borders, strict borders in this case. It is only when we look out a 
window and consider our consciousness as one of many things 
acting amongst a world of objects that we can appreciate the 
transcendence of the ego. Occupying the small, glazed parts of 
122 Ibid. p. 261
123  Sartre, J.-P. (1937). The Transcendence of the Ego. Paris, France, 
Gallimard. p. 84-6
Figure 37
Render of exterior of design 
‘A House for Sartre’
Figure 38 (opposite page)
Orthographic design 
process drawing
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the rooms that puncture through the heavy external walls and 
hover above the outside world, one gets a glimpse of this sudden 
immersion in the outside world, before retreating back into a 
world of interiority that normally dictates one’s relationship to 
one’s ego. 
Due to the analytical nature of the project, where propositional 
text has been analysed for its spatial content, orthographic 
drawings were used in the design process and for representation 
of design. Most of Sartre’s philosophical text is written abstractly, 
with real-world examples provided to corroborate its meaning. 
It shifts from writing about the absolute to the experiential. 
Philosophical writing characteristically must follow logical 
reasoning and rationality. For this reason, the objectivity 
of orthographic drawings is suited to generating a rational 
architecture. In particular, sections and axonometric drawings 
are used to show objects and structures from a non-perspectival 
standpoint. The section and axonometric show a depersonalised 
view, where an object can be viewed analytically but not from a 
personal perspective. This idea is also consistent with Sartre’s 
description of the ego – it is not from the standpoint of me, it is 
amongst the world. Our understanding of Sartre’s transcendental 
ego is that it exists in space but not from a personal viewpoint. 
The depersonalisation of space is represented by the 
documentation drawings of the design. The experience of the 
subject is also important to existential philosophy, and the 
resulting architecture is finally presented from the point of view of 
the user in perspective images.
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Figure 39
Design process drawing
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Figure 40
Design process drawing
58 Chapter 8Design Documentation: 
Sections & Plans of ‘A House for Sartre’ 
Figure 41
1:200
Ground floor plan showing internal courtyard and two staircases leading to 
different apartments. The use of two staircases is inspired by old Parisian 
buildings with a grand elevator and a servants elevator that lead to different floors. 
Users are aware of other peoples’ occupation in the building. Section cuts shown.
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Figure 42
Section 1 showing 
disruptions in floor levels
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Figure 43
Section 2
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Figure 44
Section 3
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Figure 45
Plans of each apartment and 
how they fit with one another
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Figure 46
Apartment 1 Plans, with area of 
floor belonging to another apartment 
shown in lighter shade of grey
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Figure 47
Apartment 2 Plans, with area of 
floor belonging to another apartment 
shown in lighter shade of grey
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Figure 48
Plan of Apartment 2 
on Level 2
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Figure 49
Apartment 3 Plans, with area of 
floor belonging to another apartment 
shown in lighter shade of grey
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Figure 50
Plan of Apartment 3 
on Level 9
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Figure 51
Apartment 4 Plans, with area of 
floor belonging to another apartment 
shown in lighter shade of grey
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Figure 52
Plan of Apartment 4 
on Level 6
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Chapter 9
Writing an Experience of the House
Figure 53 (opposite page)
Plan of Apartment 1 on Level 1
showing position of a visitor to 
a philosopher’s apartment
Imagine I am a visitor to a philosopher’s apartment and I have 
ascended the first flight of stairs. To my right, the elevator; steel 
framed and glazed, moving people up to higher floors, so I turn 
to my left. I enter through the large glazed door to a large open 
room, empty of people at this moment, but scattered with objects 
of use. A pair of armchairs, side by side, point toward a grand 
piano in the corner. A martini glass sits on a side table and a hat 
stand is placed (expectantly) beside the door. A small set of stairs 
disappears behind a wall. These objects tell me that this room is a 
salon; for people to gather, socialise and share ideas in a private 
retreat. I am the first to arrive. I imagine the room filling with 
guests, as it surely will tonight. Voices buzzing - mine included 
- like a muted rush hour in the subway, totally immersed in their 
surroundings. My voice will be one of many, my consciousness 
engrossed in the space crowded with others, and I will relinquish 
my personal space, absorbed by the moment.
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Figure 54 (opposite page)
Rendering of perspective of a 
visitor to Apartment 1
But then I notice the balcony overhead. A steel railing runs 
along its top. Instantly I recognise it as a handrail and imagine 
a hand resting on it, a hand connected to a body and guided 
by a watchful eye. The possibility strikes me that the balcony 
is inhabited by another person, a consciousness, a viewer. 
Suddenly I forget the image of a full, excited room of guests and 
realise that I am standing alone. My ‘aloneness’ is revealed to me, 
and I am shocked by my audacious anticipation. My confidence is 
replaced by the self-consciousness of my presence in this large 
room (in someone else’s home!). Did someone up there see me 
peer around the wall concealing the steps up to the bathroom? 
So I compose myself, standing straight, and divert my eyes back 
to the room. I decide to sit, still ever aware of my every move as if 
being watched. 
I move towards the armchairs, and notice the long horizontal 
window that provides a view down into the courtyard. Walking 
towards it I notice that from this approach I can see across 
to another identical window in the adjacent wall. In fact I see 
through both of these windows and into the space beyond, to 
the chrome legs and white moulded plastic of chairs gathered 
around a matching table – a domestic scene, of dining. I imagine 
a family or group of friends dining there (but they’re not there), 
their legs and backs wrapped in the furniture. Then I see a pair 
of hips pass closely past the glass and I freeze. From around the 
corner appears my host. “Bienvenue” he welcomes me, and I feel 
secure. I am where I am supposed to be after all. 
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Simone de Beauvoir’s boudoir is situated on the third floor. 
The affordance of space in this room draws the inhabitant’s 
attention to Sartrean spatiality:
Figure 55 (opposite page)
Plan of Apartment 1 on 
Level 4 showing Simone de 
Beauvoir’s boudoir
Consider the moment when you wake. I awake to the sun 
streaming onto the foot of my bed. The east facing windows along 
the wall adjacent to my bed allow ribbons of light and warmth to 
stir me from my dream. My thoughts start slowly, passively. Sitting 
up I see the bathtub across the room, poised on its podium. I get 
up and head towards it. Along my path I take a quick glimpse to 
my right, at the railing up in the top corner of the room. A quick 
rush of adrenalin hits me; I am instantly aware and awake. No, no 
one is passing its thin grey rails this morning; I was not seen at 
this fleeting vulnerable moment. I arrive at the bathtub and back 
to privacy.
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In the bathtub, I am perched above the street below. Only the 
silhouettes of surrounding buildings can be made out through the 
translucent glass cladding the room. Light fills the space. I must 
exit the bath at its end, as the plinth it sits on is just enough for 
the tub itself, too narrow to stand beside. At the foot of the tub I 
face the basin, I dry my face. My dressing room is to my left. To 
get there, I must cross, again, the invisible corridor that slices 
the room in two. From where the handrail sits high on the wall, 
this space is delineated by the sightline of someone occupying 
it. A narrow strip through the middle of my room. I know that 
the handrail is bolted to a landing of a  staircase, which passes 
from one floor to another, in another apartment. I can’t access 
the staircase myself, as this landing sits far too high up the wall 
of my room; this visual connection is the only access I have to 
it from my apartment. I also know it is a staircase for someone 
as from time to time I hear the sound of their feet climbing stairs 
accompanying the fleeting sight of a person passing the railings. 
Crossing the path of sight and into my dressing room, I am 
conscious of myself, of my actions, and of my consciousness 
being mine. It is not the sight of the other person who may be 
passing up the stairs that I fear, that ‘other person’  is no threat. 
It is precisely the other person’s ‘subjectness’ that makes me 
anxious; them seeing me. It is because I know that they, like me, 
have consciousness; consciousness of viewing, watching and 
judging. Before I crossed the corridor of the other’s sight, I was 
pure subjectivity, a transcendental ego, and then suddenly I am 
an object to my neighbour the subject, and my ego returns to my 
body.
Figure 56 (opposite page)
Rendering of Simone’s 
perspective in her boudoir
77
78
Sitting at my desk, I hover above the street. People appear on 
the corner, ascending from the subway, while others disappear 
down its steps, into the ground. People sip espresso at Le Duex 
Magots, stroll along the wide footpath in front of the church, shove 
their way onto buses, and dodge their bikes around unpredictable 
cars. I see consciousnesses mingling with a world of vehicles, 
buildings and objects and I am transported down to the ground, 
existing amongst them, as I watch attentively to their interaction. 
I remember reading something. I rise from my chair and turn 
towards my bookshelves. Traversing this room I pass the 
balustrade that takes the place of one of the walls of the room. 
The view from the balustrade is what appears to be a hallway, a 
circulation space, of another apartment, positioned around a void 
in the floor of this level. The matte white of the walls forms my 
view. But then a twinkle of light catches my eye below. Beneath 
the floor level of the hallway I see a glimpse of what lies below. 
Sunlight strikes the chrome tap of a kitchen sink. The floor above 
conceals most of the room from this angle, but I only need to 
see this tap perching over the stainless steel sink to know I am 
seeing into a kitchen. I can imagine the rest of the kitchen – the 
cupboards, refrigerator, stove – and a person.
Sartre’s study is located on the fourth floor and protrudes through 
the southern façade. The only room in his apartment located on 
this floor, it is bordered on two sides by spaces belonging to other 
apartments:
Figure 57 (opposite page)
Plan of Apartment 3 on Level 
7 showing Sartre’s perspective 
from his study
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Through an internal aperture in another wall I spy another chrome 
fitting. It belongs to a hand basin. From this perspective I cannot 
see anything else in the room, just the basin, but I immediately 
recognise that behind the wall must be a bathroom. The tap is 
an object for a person’s hand; it belongs in the instrumentality of 
another person. Should a person appear in the hall, I would not 
see them merely as another object amongst these others. That 
person would be the subject that encompasses all of these things 
in their instrumentality. Their consciousness gives meaning to 
these objects, acts as a reference point to which all of the objects 
refer. Even without the appearance of an inhabitant, the objects 
refer to the occupancy of another directed consciousness.
Figure 58 (opposite page)
Rendering of Sartre’s 
perspective from his study
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When I walk down this hallway I notice its close fit; its narrowness 
presents itself to me. Its corners are too tight for me to rush 
around without fear of a collision, its windows too low for me 
to gaze through. Its resistance presents itself to my body. I 
approach the stairs. I glimpse the form of another staircase, 
across from me, beyond the courtyard space. Again, my thoughts 
switch from their ordinary wanderings to focus on myself. 
Leaving the occasion early, slipping out unnoticed, I hadn’t been 
embarrassed. Now, as I see legs shuffling and hear voices 
laughing in the opposite stairwell I am suddenly aware of my 
embarrassment, ashamed of my desire to leave.
Once again I am disrupted from simply living my desires, of 
directing my thoughts this way or that. I am forced to inspect 
the content of these thoughts, the content of my mental state. 
Rather than simply experiencing a desire to leave, to proceed to 
the exit unnoticed, I am conscious of these desires, and begin 
experiencing embarrassment, anxiety and other associated 
mental acts. This introspection I am coerced into is the closest I 
come to really feeling a sense of self, and the closest I can get to 
viewing the unity of my consciousnesses: my transcendental ego.
A visitor to another apartment is departing, walking through the 
corridors to descend the stairs:
Figure 59
Plan of Apartment 4 on Level 4 
showing a guest’s perspective 
walking down the hallway
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Architectural practice and discourse offer spatial relationships 
and frameworks for philosophy, and philosophical analysis brings 
reasoning, formulating and propositions to architecture. Their 
mutual investment in one another is significant as it allows for us 
to rethink how we construct philosophical concepts and how we 
do architecture. 
Rather than dismissing architectural analogy in philosophical 
text as metaphor, it can be acknowledged as pertinent to the 
understanding of and meaning of the concept. It is significant 
that many philosophers rely on architectural language to present 
their arguments, as the concepts they describe contain spatial 
relationships. A spatial analogy cannot simply be replaced with a 
non-spatial one. 
Where philosophy and architecture have been explored 
concurrently before there was new knowledge gained about the 
limits of each. Wittgenstein appears to have gained valuable 
insight into the nature of meaning and understanding through 
the design of the Stonborough-Wittgenstein House. It was 
after working as an architect that Wittgenstein wrote about the 
visual room, an example dependent on spatial characteristics, 
which contrasts with his previously highly analytical methods of 
philosophy. Loos’s philosophy similarly cannot be separated from 
its architectural language without losing its meaning. He depends 
upon architectural discourse to write about ethics and style. His 
architecture is an extension of his philosophy, always invoking the 
sense of a deeper psychological meaning to its spaces. Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy has the most obvious association with space 
Chapter 9
Conclusions
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due to its phenomenological nature and its focus on the body. When closely analysed it can be more useful to 
architecture than just for its emphasis on visual and textural phenomena. Its complex descriptions of the way we 
understand the spatiality of a situation is used by Holl to create a rich spatial experience. 
Like these other philosophers, Sartre depends on examples that describe spatial situations to convey his 
philosophical meaning. Because his philosophy is about the world – phenomena, experience and existential 
thought – the tangible spatial relationships involved are essential to understanding the text, as the meaning is sited 
in the world. Visual, physical and imagined proximity to other people is an important concept to Sartre’s philosophy 
of consciousness, and provides rich spatial material for architecture. The notion that objects, including architectural 
features, are incorporated into one’s corporeality is another important concept where philosophy and physicality 
interact. These concepts have been explored and tested throughout the design, creating a new way of thinking 
about Sartre’s philosophy of consciousness: in terms of architecture.
‘A House for Sartre’, a building comprising four urban apartments, is an extension of Sartre’s philosophy in a 
domestic context. Domesticity provides objects, such as furniture, and psychological concepts, such as privacy, 
that are valuable to the project. However, the philosophical concepts here are not particular; they are concerned 
with concrete essences. We interact with all architecture primarily by experiencing it. We understand architecture 
through conscious experience of it. Sartre’s philosophy deals with the nature of experience, consciousness and 
existence. Architecture that incorporates or is incorporated by this philosophy can have the ability to engender an 
experience of the philosophy. This kind of architectural experience is not a passive one, but a conscious one; a 
conscious experience of both the architecture and the philosophy.
Philosophy aims to make clear the nature of essences of the world through its own discourse. Text is relied upon 
to define, argue and present ideas. Architecture is the physical construal of these ideas. Sartre addresses the loss 
of the ‘self’, anxiety, adversity and other maxims of existentialism by directing his reader to look at the acts of their 
own consciousness. Architecture can make its inhabitants aware of their own consciousness and the consequences 
of this awareness through the manipulation of their bodies in space. The nature of space is that it interacts not only 
with our bodies, but also with our consciousness. Perhaps this is why consciousness appeals to architectural space 
to constitute itself. Architectural space is foundational to consciousness.
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